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CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWING
Nelson Tebbe*
Robert L. Tsai**
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain
is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across
doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice
itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater
theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional
borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes
its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing,
and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas
migrate between fields of law associated with liberty, on the one
hand, and equality, on the other. We finish by discussing how attentiveness to borrowing may illuminate or improve prominent
theories of constitutional lawmaking.
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Introduction
In the American system, areas of constitutional law are often conceptualized separately—think of free speech, equal protection, separation of
powers. Perhaps due to that tendency, a common phenomenon has gone surprisingly unnoticed in the literature: constitutional borrowing. In this
Article, we aim to bring that practice to light, showing how borrowing
works in everyday practice and assessing its implications for American constitutionalism. Our investigation, at bottom, concerns how separate bodies of
legal knowledge are interconnected and managed.
1
Consider Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a
law criminalizing homosexual conduct violated the right to “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. It is possible to see in the decision an
appropriation from the language of equality. Justice Kennedy explained:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct . . . are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law
which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
2
reasons.

The mere existence of laws regulating homosexual conduct amounts to “an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
3
and in the private spheres.” Moreover, as Kennedy stressed, Bowers v.

1.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

2. Id. at 575. Toward the end of the majority opinion, the themes of respect and antistigmatization again populate the reasoning of the Court: “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” Id. at 578.
3.

Id. at 575.

TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC

February 2010]

12/21/2009 1:26 PM

Constitutional Borrowing

461

4

Hardwick’s “continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
5
persons.” This is a layered response to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which would have decided the case on equal protection grounds.
It is also a prominent instance of constitutional borrowing. Despite formally refusing the equality rationale, the Lawrence Court nevertheless
appropriated the rhetoric of equality—“stigma,” “discrimination,” and “respect”—to stake the claim that its liberty approach simultaneously protects
core equality values.
The phenomenon is not limited to the Supreme Court. Across many institutions legal actors engage in constitutional borrowing for a range of
purposes and with complex effects, some apparent and others less obvious.
What is interesting to us is that virtually all discussion surrounding instances of borrowing has concerned the substantive appropriateness of the
specific appropriation and not the practice itself. Borrowing is simply assumed to be as legitimate as any other mode of persuasion.
In this Article, we set out to name, organize, and evaluate the dynamics
of constitutional borrowing. Part I defines and describes the phenomenon.
To anticipate, constitutional borrowing is the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of
6
constitutional law into another for persuasive ends. We offer several detailed examples, drawing on cases from contrasting bodies of law and time
periods. Throughout, we hold to the view that constitutional borrowing
comprises a set of practices that can meaningfully and profitably be analyzed together. We pay particular attention to cases in which the Court has
traded between liberty and equality. Partly that is because several prominent
commentators have recently advocated more aggressive use of liberty doctrines to effectuate what have traditionally been viewed as egalitarian
7
objectives. Therefore, an assessment of these moves seems timely.
Borrowing occurs throughout the law, of course. While we hope that our
study will have wide appeal as a consequence, we focus for now on the peculiar challenges of constitutional borrowing. Appropriations in this context
can raise democratic considerations of the first order, some of which are
particular to constitutional law.
Part II presents a typology of constitutional borrowing, focusing on four
everyday forms: transplantation, hedging, displacement, and corruption.
4.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

5.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.

6. Throughout the Article, we use terms such as “borrowing,” “appropriation,”
“cross-pollination,” “migration,” and “cross-fertilization” interchangeably. These different words
convey the same idea and signify no added distinctions. No descriptor can perfectly capture all of
the nuances of the phenomenon, and becoming absorbed with metaphors can distract from the
central question of how ideas transcend imagined boundaries. See generally The Migration of
Constitutional Ideas (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
7. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in The
Constitution in 2020, at 93 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Kenji Yoshino, The
Pressure to Cover, N.Y. Times Mag., Jan. 15, 2006, at 32.
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These forms can be distinguished based on the borrower’s motivations, the
circumstances under which the tactic might be preferred, and the persuasive
effects and doctrinal consequences entailed. We offer practical illustrations
of each type, recognizing that real-world examples often blend two or more
of them.
Part III undertakes a considered defense of cross-pollination. On
balance, we conclude that constitutional borrowing serves important ruleof-law values, especially commitments to generality, participation, and
accountability. Creating a shared repertoire of persuasive moves also
opens up possibilities for strategic leveraging by advocates, who may seize
opportunities to deploy a device or framework from one field of
constitutional law in some other area. In this way, the custom of borrowing
empowers citizens and officials alike to take governing principles
seriously. It also promises systemic gains, not only promoting certain
doctrines in the target domain, but also reinforcing the source idea. For all
these reasons, and despite some real dangers, we endorse the general
practice.
Even though borrowing is a legitimate and widely accepted part of constitutional lawmaking, it would be a mistake to leap to the conclusion that
every act of borrowing is either valid or successful. Part IV presents four
criteria by which a particular presentation can be evaluated: fit, transparency, completeness, and yield. This list is not exhaustive, but it offers a tool
for organizing further critiques. Part V elaborates how the practice of importation may illuminate or improve five prominent theories: originalism, living
constitutionalism, minimalism, redemptive constitutionalism, and popular
constitutionalism.
I. What Is Constitutional Borrowing?
Our first task is to define the phenomenon of constitutional borrowing.
Precision will allow readers to assess whether, in fact, the tendency to appropriate is as pervasive as we claim. Once we settle on a working definition
of borrowing, we will give some reasons why legal actors may be tempted
to cross over from one legal area to another. We then will offer an example
of strategic appropriation that also previews some of its risks.
A. A Definition
For some, the term constitutional borrowing will conjure an act of origi8
nal design, such as when drafters of a new charter insert language taken
from another people’s governing document. In describing constitutional bor8. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional borrowing and nonborrowing, 1
Int’l J. Const. L. 196, 197 (2003) (describing borrowing as “ ‘a case of’ a larger phenomenon:
institutional design”); Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 Conn. L.
Rev. 907 (2005) (challenging both the model of the “imposed constitution” and the model of the
“indigenous constitution”); see also infra note 15.
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rowing, we do not mean to exclude that initial act of creativity, but we are
more interested in the many less formal but far more prevalent aspects of
borrowing, such as the ordinary importation of doctrine from one field of
domestic law into another. Our goal, then, is to open everyone’s eyes to the
practices of everyday appropriation.
1. What do we mean by constitutional borrowing? A person engages in
borrowing when, in the course of trying to persuade someone to adopt a
reading of the Constitution, that person draws on one domain of constitutional knowledge in order to interpret, bolster, or otherwise illuminate
9
another domain. It is, in other words, an interpretive practice characterized
by a deliberate effort to bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive
ends.
Notice a few features of this definition. First, it assumes that the average
practitioner thinks of constitutional law as organized into separate, bounded,
and coherent domains. Practicing lawyers do not commonly work with constitutional law as an undifferentiated whole, but instead experience it as
organized into discrete bodies of legal knowledge, such as free speech, substantive due process, equal protection, criminal procedure, or separation of
powers. Either explicitly or implicitly, they accept that each of these special10
ties enjoys some degree of separateness and integrity. That working
perception makes borrowing possible. It may occur, for instance, when a
court is faced with two arguments—say, a due process claim and an equal
protection claim—and chooses to endorse the former while drawing language from decisions associated with the latter. Such an attempt to blur
ideas of equality and liberty is what we perceive to be happening in Lawrence, even though the majority opinion formally declined to find an
equality violation. That example also illustrates an interesting tension.
While on the one hand borrowing depends on legal boundaries, on the other
hand it works to weaken doctrinal distinctiveness.
A second feature of our definition is that any person with a basic understanding of political or legal history can engage in the practice. Although our
examples here highlight the behavior of judges, many other constitutional
9. One might object to our use of the term “borrowing,” since in ordinary usage that word
can connote the temporary taking of an object with the intention of returning it unaltered. That is not
always how the practice works. As we explain, a borrowed constitutional idea or mechanism may
return (or be reused) in prior sites, sometimes with little alteration, and at other times, completely
transformed. Nevertheless, we retain the term, mostly because of its intuitive appeal.
10. One could complain that Supreme Court Justices care little for doctrinal niceties and
instead seek to assemble coalitions of their colleagues by whatever means necessary. Because borrowing is not possible where boundaries are thought to be meaningless, the work of the Court
cannot properly be called borrowing on this account. Two responses occur to us. First, we think it
important that some Justices do not perceive their own reasoning process in such crude terms. After
all, they do feel the need to justify instances of borrowing and they do not hesitate to critique moves
that they think unjustifiably breach constitutional boundaries. We give numerous examples of judicial defenses and critiques of borrowing throughout this Article. Second, even if we treat Supreme
Court decisions as fraught with politics, as any serious observer must, that strategic calculations and
horse trading happen behind closed doors is not incompatible with a broader perception that respect
for doctrinal boundaries is essential to the rule of law.

TEBBE & TSAI FINAL 2M.DOC

464

12/21/2009 1:26 PM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 108:459

actors can and often do argue across disparate areas of law, including attorneys, legislators, executive branch officials, political candidates, activists,
and ordinary citizens. Wherever constitutional interpretation happens, borrowing is likely to be found.
Third, borrowing is purposive, an intentional act of creative lifting.
Whatever else may accompany a choice to borrow, a good faith choice to do
so entails a calculation that resorting to another body of knowledge will enhance the rule of law or otherwise improve the odds of a position being
accepted by others. Once again, Lawrence offers a useful illustration. The
Justices wished to strengthen the interpretive choice they made by insisting
that the liberty approach actually served the cause of fair treatment promoted by equality norms. In suggesting that liberty claims can enhance
equality, they also encouraged liberty-style moves by indicating judicial
receptivity to such forms of argument. Because a perceptive advocate will
mimic strategies that are endorsed by authoritative decisionmakers, borrowing not only legitimates a particular outcome, but it also opens up
interpretive possibilities and activates particular grammars, while simultaneously dissuading other modes of argumentation. After all, any high-profile
instance of cross-fertilization will reduce resistance to subsequent crossovers.
Fourth, our definition hones in on crossover among legal domains. Now,
of course, an important field of scholarship examines interactions between
legal and political discourses—in fact, one of us has made a contribution to
11
that literature. We realize that it might make conceptual sense to classify
that sort of crossover as borrowing. Merely distinguishing between legal and
political ways of talking is notoriously difficult. This Article brackets those
issues and focuses attention on the migration that happens among legal
fields.
Fifth, for the most part we put to one side appropriations that bridge
constitutional systems (“intersystem” borrowing), focusing instead on ones
that span discrete fields of domestic constitutional law (“intrasystem” borrowing). Although we think the concept of borrowing is capacious enough
to include transnational migration without losing its conceptual coherence,
and although one or two of our examples below will treat instances of intersystemic borrowing, we concentrate here on the more commonplace
phenomenon of exchange between fields of domestic law. We do that chiefly
because intrasystemic borrowing has gone largely unnoticed in the literature, while appropriations from country to country have been widely
analyzed, both when it occurs at the stage of original drafting and when it
takes the form of citation to foreign law.
It is important to be precise about what does not constitute borrowing.
Arguing from precedent within a given domain—that is, saying that an earlier resolution or rule controls the outcome of a controversy at bar—could
11.
(2008).

Robert L. Tsai, Eloquence and Reason: Creating a First Amendment Culture
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not be described as such. That is true by virtue of our definition, since we
have specified that borrowing trades among constitutional fields, whereas
precedent works to bind courts within a field. So, for instance, when the
Lawrence Court drew on Casey to support the proposition that “our laws and
12
tradition afford constitutional protection to [certain] personal decisions,”
the ruling engaged in straightforward reasoning from precedent rather than
cross-fertilization. Referring to an authoritative decision within a certain
area therefore will not typically involve borrowing as we are using the term.
Also excluded from the concept is the deployment of devices that so
pervade the law that they are not unique to any particular constitutional
field. Use of those sorts of mechanisms could not be considered borrowing.
For instance, slippery-slope arguments are commonplace throughout the
law. When someone makes that sort of consequentialist argument—or deflects it by invoking the common defense, “not while this court sits”—he or
she is simply using a form of argument that cuts across legal areas and is
foreign to none. That does not qualify as borrowing.
2. How is borrowing typically resisted? It is not always easy to tell when
borrowing happens so it helps to know what to look for. Questions of legitimacy surround all exercises in constitutional borrowing because they
involve exchanges between potentially incompatible domains of legal
knowledge. A key to identifying an act of borrowing, therefore, lies in the
nature of an opponent’s possible response. Often it will take the form of an
objection that the proposed borrowing is inappropriate on the ground that
the domains of legal knowledge should be kept apart. Even a covert instance
of borrowing may be ferreted out by asking whether it can be plausibly resisted by asserting the integrity of a domain.
In each of the examples we analyze below, opponents of an act of appropriation could have defended a boundary between constitutional
domains, or in fact did so. Where connections were not being proposed for
the first time, more subtle efforts of resistance to borrowing were likely to
be found rather than outright denials that such a relationship could ever be
possible. In lieu of claiming that the source of law was off limits entirely, an
opponent of borrowing may have objected that the proposed idea was outmoded, unenlightened, or nonrepresentative. Sometimes an opponent argued
that borrowing would interfere with prior commitments or unsettle precedent. Any one of these reactions could have alerted readers to an act of
constitutional borrowing.
3. Is borrowing a form of interpretation? Not every way of working with
canonical texts should be subsumed within the term interpretation. Making
that mistake could unthinkingly privilege dominant theories while obscuring
the mechanics of more creative, more subtle, methods of creating constitutional meaning.

12.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
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Borrowing augments formal modalities of interpretation, such as those
13
arising from text, history, structure, precedent, or animating principles. In
the usual course, an idea or heuristic might be borrowed, and therefore harnessed, in the service of one of these types of formal argument. It could be
something as simple as asserting a profound and abiding interrelationship
14
between two legal provisions not obvious from the face of the instrument.
Or it could be a more contested move, such as drawing upon the experience,
laws, or precedents of another constituted people, such as the English or
French, in staking a claim about the genesis and public meaning of a domestic provision.
Borrowing therefore has a peculiar relationship to the familiar modalities of constitutional argumentation. It is neither an officially recognized
argument nor has it ever been ruled completely out of bounds. At the same
time, the prevalence of borrowing suggests that actors within the system
find it invaluable. We think these two features—informality plus indispensability—render it a subsidiary practice. This is a major reason why few will
openly admit to engaging in borrowing, yet why its legitimacy generally
goes unquestioned.
Another way of appreciating borrowing’s mercurial place in the legal
order is to consider its relationship to the study of constitutional law as a
discipline. We plan to say more on this topic later. For now, notice that each
formal method of interpretation is loosely associated with a normative theory of judicial review: exegesis is linked to textualism; historical
argumentation embodies a commitment to originalism; ethical arguments
can be seen as a corollary to living constitutionalism, and so forth. As far as
we can tell, no one has yet articulated a theory of constitutionalism in which
borrowing is the engine of interpretation, much less a self-contained account
of a constitution’s substance. Again, this suggests that while something important is happening when borrowing takes place, legal actors intuitively
realize it is not quite accurate to call it an interpretive modality.
In our view, the rationale for refusing to elevate borrowing to the status
of a modality is not that borrowing is illegitimate, but that, unlike a formal
argument, it is not necessarily tethered to any substantive commitments
about what a constitution is or should be. A textual argument presumes that
a constitution is in crucial respects like a contract, where the drafters’ manifest intentions should be honored; a historical argument acknowledges that a
constitution is an act of political contingency; an ethical argument takes as
its starting point that a constitution is aspirational. Borrowing makes none of

13. For works that have tried to describe, catalogue, and delimit the forms of constitutional
argumentation, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution
(1982), Pierre Schlag & David Skover, Tactics of Legal Reasoning (1986).
14. Thus, borrowing encompasses not only what Akhil Amar calls “intratextualism,” but also
a wide range of relationships that can be asserted between text- or nontext-based sources of constitutional knowledge. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).
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these claims, and in the refusal, proves its capacity to aid a range of substantive conceptions of the Constitution.
4. What can be borrowed? As comparativists are well aware, it is possible to borrow an entire constitution, select written provisions, or particular
15
precedents or customs. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. If we broaden
our perspective, it becomes possible to identify all manner of legal appropriations, both between different legal systems and within what we
commonly treat as a single political order.
In truth, any element that can reasonably be used to persuade another as
to the authoritative meaning of the Constitution is a candidate for appropriation. We do not limit ourselves to rationales or rules, as important as such
features are to the process, but rather we include a diverse array of material
and strategies that can be used during constitutional debate:
*

legal texts

*

frameworks

*

arguments

*

doctrinal tests

*

phrases or figures of speech

*

rationales

*

principles

*

ideas

*

cultural materials (experiences, prototypes, etc.).

Because the sheer magnitude of appropriations is daunting, we limit ourselves here to the American practice of constitutional borrowing. We look at
the ways in which domestic actors work across multiple bodies of constitutional knowledge for persuasive ends.
B. Some Reasons to Borrow
Why might a person resort to borrowing? Common reasons include an
intention to achieve a durable synthesis of areas of law whose connections
have been neglected; to take advantage of accumulated wisdom; to blur doctrinal boundaries and unsettle existing categories deliberately; or to secure a

15. Leading comparative studies differ from ours because they typically focus on crossborder appropriation of ideas, and often within a single area of constitutional law. See, e.g., Mary L.
Dudziak, Thurgood Marshall’s Bill of Rights for Kenya, 11 Green Bag 2d 307 (2008); Epstein &
Knight, supra note 8; Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational
judicial discourse, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 91 (2004); Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some
Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 640 (1999);
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 389
(2004); Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 325 (1998).
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perceived strategic advantage in debate more generally. In fact, a borrower’s
reasons for acting ordinarily consist of some combination of private and
public intentions. Some motivations may be self-regarding in nature, such as
a hope to profit personally from the success of litigation or politics; others
will have a public cast to them, such as a desire to enhance an advocate’s or
adjudicator’s reputation or to preserve the prerogative of a particular institution, all of which might be gained through a statesmanlike balance of
constitutional interests. Other-regarding motivations include concern for the
aesthetics of the law (including coherence of the law and respect for the
sources of law), concern for how the law is perceived by those who are affected by it, a more specific plan to curry favor with or allay the concerns of
certain democratic constituencies, and so on. We will say more about these
various motivations in the next Part, where we sort out common types of
borrowing.
For now, we emphasize that although a number of private and public intentions may motivate an actor to participate in constitutional debate,
borrowing is legitimate only if it is guided by a measure of public virtue. To
minimally comply with the rule of law, the act must be underwritten by the
advocate–adjudicator’s good faith. We describe “good faith” simply as an
honest desire to arrive at a defensible position and enhance general under16
standing of the law. A borrower acts virtuously if her act of creativity is
moved by public-spirited reasons, even when accompanied by self-regarding
motives. Just as we presume a legislative act is reasonable unless there is
persuasive evidence to believe otherwise, so too we presume an act of borrowing is legitimate, unless there are reasons to impugn a borrower’s
motivations.
Whether a particular act of borrowing is successful, in that it persuades
or becomes authoritative, however, is a different matter entirely. The success
of a specific instance of borrowing turns on a host of factors such as fit,
17
transparency, completeness, and yield—criteria we take up in due course.
It might be said then, that any plausible act of borrowing must take place
under these minimal conditions:
1.

A motivated borrower with the requisite disposition who believes the
tactic will advance his interests, as well as at least rudimentary knowledge of the forms to be used.

2.

A prospective audience expected to have some knowledge of the constitutional ideas involved.

3.

Two bodies of knowledge ordinarily understood as discrete, at least one
of which is sufficiently developed that it is appealing to the borrower
and reasonably appealing to the borrower’s audience.

16. We later consider an instance of bad faith borrowing, point out how to recognize it, and
explain why borrowing without integrity is corrosive of rule-of-law values. See infra Section II.D.
17.

See infra Part IV.
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The study of borrowing is concerned with how these three conditions are
satisfied and, more precisely, how constitutional actors navigate these conditions in real world situations.
C. A Few Causes for Concern
As prevalent as the practice may be, the choice to engage in constitutional borrowing, like other methods of persuasion, entails certain risks. In
this Section, we offer an example of borrowing that not only illustrates our
definition of the practice, but also previews some of its dangers. A fuller
discussion of its vices and virtues appears in Part III.
The most obvious danger is discordance. Not every legal idea is compatible with another—the relationships may not be intuitive, the union may
seem forced, and the result may be a jumble rather than a useful harmonization of existing lines of thought. Since basic rule-of-law values include
notice and an opportunity to comport one’s behavior to the law, borrowing
carries a risk of confusion that may have real-world ramifications.
Second, because in the real world constitutional ideas are often associated with constituencies, borrowing often asks one group of idea holders to
assume certain new idea relationships. Resistance may have to be overcome.
Police officers or prosecutors might not believe they have a stake in a
synthetic reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; straights may not
feel their constitutional interests are aligned with those of gay and lesbian
couples. If these connections are poorly managed, the result could be greater
discord rather than accord (though some level of disputation may be a
precondition for the germination of new ideas).
Third, principled synthesizing can disintegrate into noncommittal compromising or rote copying that blurs doctrinal categories for selfish or shortterm goals. It may be tempting to gesture in the direction of another set of
ideas merely to salve bruised feelings, validate a personal preference, or get
past the dispute at hand by whatever means necessary. A single instance of
careless borrowing may be forgiven or eventually forgotten, but a sustained
pattern of misbehavior can breed cynicism about the law. It may raise
doubts about the competence or integrity of decisionmakers or, if confusion
reigns for too long, it may even destabilize support for one or more areas of
law.
18
Stanley v. Georgia presents an intriguing microstudy of borrowing’s attractions and challenges. There, the Justices disallowed the prosecution of a
man who possessed obscene materials in his home. Justice Marshall’s opinion stressed (a) the permeability or limitations of one constitutional domain
(the First Amendment), and (b) the salience and compatibility of another
domain of knowledge (the Fourth Amendment):

18.

394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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In this context, we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by
citing Roth [which held obscenity unprotected]. Roth and its progeny
certainly do mean that the [First Amendment] recognize[s] a valid
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the
assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all
constitutional protections.
. . . Moreover, in the context of this case—a prosecution for mere
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own
home—that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
19
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.

That Stanley’s legal principles are a product of synthesis renders them espe20
cially malleable. As an illustration, Bowers v. Hardwick contained a
controversial refusal to borrow the case. Here is how Justice White’s opinion
explained the Justices’ decision to decline the opportunity: “Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected outside the home, and it
partially prevented the enforcement of state obscenity laws; but the decision
was firmly grounded in the First Amendment. The right pressed upon us
21
here has no similar support in the text of the Constitution . . . .” In other
words, although the original decision involved a harmonization of the First
and Fourth Amendments, Bowers isolates the precedent and tries to drain it
of persuasive power by emphasizing only the speech strand of the synthe22
sis. Justice White facilitates this move by arguing that the text supports one
claim (Stanley’s speech) but not the other (Hardwick’s plea for privacy).
Moreover, the added textual precondition for borrowing fashioned by the
Court ignores the fact that Stanley’s own claim required interpreting the
word “speech” to protect sexually explicit materials, just as the conclusion
that Hardwick’s claim was nontextual required an effort to characterize it
that way rather than as a textually grounded claim of “liberty” as that word
23
is used in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

19.

Id. at 563–64.

20.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

21.

Id. at 195.

22. This is one of the risks of borrowing: one combination of concepts or principles can be
disentangled or disaggregated at a different point in time. For another example, see Justice Stewart’s
concurring opinion in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), taking apart both Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Of Griswold, he writes,
“Although the broad language of the opinion includes a discussion of privacy, the constitutional
protection there discovered also related to (1) marriage; (2) privacy in the home; and (3) the right to
use contraceptives. Whatever the ratio decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608–09 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
23. At its best, such a step would say that the fact that a concept appears in the Constitution
shows its importance to the Founding generation. At its silliest, the inquiry would devolve into
whether or not a word or idea was mentioned by the Framers or not and accord that fact decisive
weight.
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The heightened privacy interests identified in Stanley have been highlighted to protect the receipt of certain information, including adult
24
pornography, but not child pornography involving real children. Moreover,
Stanley’s privacy language has been used by lawyers to resist mandatory
25
union dues used for advocacy with which one disagrees, but not to make
26
27
end-of-life decisions, use drugs for therapeutic purposes, or, until re28
cently, engage in consensual sodomy. Mostly for the better, though
sometimes for the worse, the enhanced manipulability of Stanley has something to do with constitutional borrowing. Mixing constitutional ideas can
lead to the selective assertion of one interest at the expense of the other.
Sometimes the outcome is principled and logical; other times, decisions to
borrow (or refusals to borrow) are so strained they seem outcome determinative.
Such concerns aside, we think borrowing’s benefits for the rule of law
outweigh its downsides because, among other things, the practice facilitates
the formation of a robust constitutional culture and encourages individuals
to take principles seriously. In Part III, we take up a defense of constitutional borrowing as a general practice, while recognizing that particular
instances may require more scrutiny.
II. Some Types of Borrowing
We now consider several common types of borrowing: (a) transplantation; (b) hedging; (c) displacement; and (d) corruption. These do not
comprise the complete universe of types, but they capture much of the action. We give examples of each form, discuss why a constitutional actor
might resort to one or another of them, and probe some of the benefits and
risks associated with each. Some of the instances we analyze involve borrowing from liberty for equality’s sake or vice versa; others may consist of
cross-pollination among the domains typically associated with liberty.

24. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see also Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[W]e have held that in a variety of contexts
‘the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.’ ” (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at
564)). Interestingly enough, Stanley has been cited favorably to protect a person who views a sexually explicit image that appears to be of a real child but turns out not to be. See Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
25. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[A]t the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State.” (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565)).
26.

See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 341 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-

27.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

28.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

ing).
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A. Transplantation
Perhaps the most common method of borrowing is transplantation of le29
gal ideas, in whole or piecemeal, from one context to another. Importing an
idea into a new domain is tempting when the idea possesses a track record
of success in the sense that it seems defensible, has proven useful, or, quite
apart from its demonstrated utility, enjoys support among specialists or the
30
public.
A prominent instance of transplantation culminated in Planned Parent31
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. There, use of the “undue
burden” test heralded a newly sensitized attitude toward the competing challenges presented when a state regulates an individual’s decision to abort an
32
unwanted fetus. That formulation replaced the more protective, but less
elegant trimester framework fashioned by Roe v. Wade. Little attention has
been paid to the migration of the undue-burden test. In fact, it had been se33
lectively used in liberty cases, but was originally deployed to determine
when a state law interfered with Congress’s dormant power to regulate
34
Commerce. Casey doesn’t acknowledge this lineage, but it does reference

29. What we describe is a juridically mediated version of what Alan Watson has elaborated.
See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to the Study of Comparative Law (2d
ed. 1993). Watson’s approach has been challenged, most notably by Legrand, for understating the
connections between law and society. Pierre Legrand, What Legal Transplants, in Adapting Legal
Cultures 55 (D. Nelken & J. Feest eds., 2001). In using the term “transplant,” we emphasize the
possibility of conscious adaptation of ideas, while embracing a more robust notion of legal culture.
30. With an original act of transplantation, the most pressing concerns that arise are fit and
completeness (discussed at greater length in Part IV).
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice O’Connor employed the phrase “undue burden” in an abortion
controversy in her concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 529–30
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), as well as in her opinions in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), foreshadowed the shift in meaning that would be
entailed in transplanting the undue-burden approach into the abortion context. First, Justice Powell’s
opinion stated that although the right to privacy “protects the woman from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy[,] [i]t implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.” Id. at 473–74. Powell referenced
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), for this proposition, but that opinion does not employ the
language “undue burden.” See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. Second, Maher declined to adopt the
reasoning of rulings typically associated with the undue-burden test in the right-to-travel cases
(where an undue burden usually led to the application of strict scrutiny), characterizing them as
embodying a “penalty analysis” inapplicable to public subsidy of abortions. Id. at 474 n.8.
Relatedly, the Justices refused to find guidance in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which
they considered to be unique to the Religion Clauses. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.8.
33. It has been used in the right-to-travel area. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 663–
77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing whether a one-year welfare residence requirement
amounts to an undue burden upon the right of interstate travel).
34. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“[W]e have held that [the
Commerce] Clause . . . bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”) (internal
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election law cases for support of the proposition that even a recognized liberty interest can be restricted by the states without violating the
35
Constitution, concluding: “The abortion right is similar.”
It is worth pausing to evaluate the mechanics of the importation. First,
adoption of the undue-burden test frequently grants discretion to the government that did not previously exist. The approach is unclear about whether
an illicit motivation on the part of the state actor is important or whether the
actual imposition on a rights bearer is all that matters. Second, in at least
some instances, the undue burden approach has been deemed inappropriate
for a particular setting. Jurists do not always explain why officials will be
afforded greater discretion in some settings but not in others. Third, in many
places the undue-burden test offers a supplementary approach to determining a violation of constitutional principle, whereas Casey made it the
exclusive measure of a woman’s right to end her pregnancy. These conse36
quences—which together make up the transplantation’s “yield” —are not
always self-evident or permanent, but they are crucial to how borrowing
ought to be assessed.
This leads us to a further point: a choice not to transplant can itself be
37
momentous. It may tell of methods bypassed or principles rejected,
motivations at work, conflicts deferred, or the range of future outcomes
38
constrained. District of Columbia v. Heller, which interpreted the Second
Amendment to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms, illustrates
how. Toward the end of the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia addressed
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which proposed a test for Second Amendment
claims that would “ask[] whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a
way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects

citations omitted); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating a
“clearly excessive” burden test for incidental burdens on interstate commerce).
35.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 873–74. As the Casey decision pointedly states:

[N]ot every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement
of that right. An example clarifies the point. We have held that not every ballot access limitation amounts to an infringement of the right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial
flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for whom
they wish to vote. . . . The abortion right is similar.

Id. (citations omitted).
36.

See infra Section IV.D.

37. These decisions have been called “non-borrowings.” See Epstein & Knight, supra note 8.
Kim Lane Scheppele suggests that students of political design think more broadly in “aversive”
terms, namely, by reflecting on “the negative models that are prominent in constitution builders’
minds.” Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and aversive constitutionalism: The case for studying
cross-constitutional influence through negative models, 1 Int’l J. Const. L. 296, 300 (2003).
38. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). For critiques of Heller, see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 923 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Second
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (2008); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551 (2009).
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39

upon other important governmental interests.” That proved to be too much
for Scalia, who set about explaining why Breyer’s approach was misguided.
The Justices’ self-conscious refusal to borrow an undue-burden or “interest balancing” approach had several consequences. First, the Court’s
resistance to balancing was intended to convey commitment. Breyer’s approach would have impermissibly empowered judges to determine “on a
40
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” As
Scalia put it, “[a] constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assess41
ments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Second,
bypassing the test signaled a stronger protective position for enumerated
rights than for implied ones. “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
42
‘interest-balancing’ approach,” Scalia wrote. He thereby declined to protect
the right to bear arms in the same way as a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy.
Instead, Heller adopted something akin to the First Amendment’s ruleand-exception approach. Drawing heavily on free speech ideas, Scalia insisted:
We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of
a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. The First Amendment contains
the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included
exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for
the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of an
interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now con43
duct for them anew.

Borrowing from the First Amendment appeared to serve two persuasive
ends in Heller: (1) enlisting popular respect for expressive rights on behalf
of gun owners; and (2) turning the question of whether balancing occurs
44
into a question of who properly balances. It also bolstered the Court’s rejection of balancing approaches drawn from other areas of constitutional
law.

39. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. Justice Breyer applied his standard to “assess the extent to
which the District’s law burdens the interests that the Second Amendment seeks to protect,” id. at
2861 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He “weigh[ed] needs and burdens,” id. at 2864, and concluded that the
ordinance “burdens the Second Amendment’s primary objective little, or not at all.” Id. at 2863. He
justified the approach by referring to other instances of more deferential approaches, including
election law cases, procedural due process opinions, and decisions involving the speech rights of
public employees. See id. at 2852.
40.

Id. at 2821 (majority opinion).

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. (citation omitted).

44. For the Heller Court, reasoning in a textualist–originalist spirit, the answer is the founding generation rather than present day judges or policymakers.
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The Court’s move in Heller was explicit, but a refusal to appropriate can
be so subtle that it may be missed by the casual observer. In Washington v.
45
Harper, for instance, Justice Kennedy turned aside an inmate’s liberty
claim to be free from psychotropic drugs in the absence of judicial review.
Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, showed
the path not taken: an extension of the right to “freedom of the mind”
46
stressed in Stanley v. Georgia. For them, the Court missed an opportunity
to adapt this language from the prior ruling: “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s
47
minds.” We can envision a number of reasons why Stanley might not have
been appealing to the majority. Perhaps they felt it better to limit the concept
spatially, to the home, rather than extend the case to public institutions. Perhaps this entire way of thinking was deemed improper when it came to
incarcerated persons. Whatever the truth, Harper’s rejection of this framework sub silentio involved an inobtrusive but nevertheless significant refusal
to engage in transplantation.
B. Hedging
We earlier described an instance of borrowing—Lawrence—in which
multiple rationales were available, and, having selected one rationale over
48
another, the Court deliberately blurred the differences between them. We
now name this particular move hedging, because it is frequently undertaken
to reduce the risks and disadvantages of making a singular doctrinal commitment. Often, hedging occurs when there is already an established (or at
least a working) relationship between two legal domains (e.g., two clauses
of the Constitution, related political values, and so on).
This form of borrowing may strive to ameliorate troublesome features of
common law decisionmaking. The problem with embracing a single rationale, or textual basis, for a particular resolution is the risk of becoming overly
constrained in the future by existing precedent (including erroneous or outmoded decisions), by long-unexamined analytical frameworks, or by
assumptions that turn out to be mistaken. If legal decisions were simply
about conforming to past forms or existing expectations, there would be
little to worry about. Yet adjudication is also about looking forward, predicting whether and to what degree other social actors will conform their
behavior to the law. In this sense, hedging provides one route for escaping
some of the undesirable features of path-dependent adjudication. If the
choice to endorse and explicate a liberty rationale at the moment of decision
45. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The state in question allowed such decisions to be made by medical
experts, with some administrative review.
46.

394 U.S. 557 (1969).

47.

Harper, 494 U.S. at 238 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565).

48.
(2003)).

See supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
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proves too difficult to sustain in the face of social pressure, if it meets unexpected circumstances, or if it winds up at a logical dead end, the basis of an
alternative rationale has already been introduced. Because of path dependence, a line of argument or idea is far easier to sustain if it has already been
introduced into an area of law than if it is must be raised for the first time.
Thus, the incentives of a common law system may push actors to seize the
chance to present even incomplete renderings rather than wait for an opportunity to make a systematic presentation.
From an institutional perspective, hedging can reflect a compromise to
achieve consensus among members of an adjudicative body. The primary
rationale may be the one that gains the broadest assent of decisionmakers
within an institution; gesturing in the direction of a secondary rationale
might well be a pragmatic solution to retain certain wavering members of a
coalition.
Hedging may also reflect an effort to safeguard against misjudging the
nature and extent of social support for a decision by deliberately minimizing
differences between rationales. This amounts to an external explanation:
drawing on a secondary body of knowledge is useful for promoting public
acceptance of the main rationale. Still, there may be costs. The most serious
risk with hedging is uncertainty about the seriousness of an actor’s commitment to a set of governing values and the circumstances under which
they might be controlling.
Embrace of a secondary set of ideas may be aimed at a subset of constitutional actors rather than the public at large. As such, hedging should not be
understood as unprincipled or frivolous commentary, but instead as sophisti49
cated signaling. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, a decision now known as an early and
strong statement against racial discrimination, may have involved targeted
signaling through borrowing. Yick Wo, one of several Chinese laundry operators refused a permit by the City of San Francisco, challenged the denial
on two grounds: (1) the city’s ordinance was unduly vague and lacked procedural safeguards; and (2) the city’s refusal to renew his permit to operate a
laundry constituted an effort to harass or oppress him on account of race or
national origin. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Board’s nonrenewal of the Chinese applicant’s permit violated the Equal Protection
Clause since it appeared to be motivated by racial animus. Instead of resting
on one set of virtues, the opinion by Justice Mathews careened toward the
liberty rationale before making a sudden break for equality.
The Yick Wo opinion went out of its way to disagree with the California
Supreme Court as to “the real meaning of the ordinances in question.” Although the state court had found it neither arbitrary nor unusual to regulate
the laundry industry in the abstract, several devastating paragraphs characterized the city ordinance as both “arbitrary” and “unusual”—conventional
due process language:

49.

118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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[The ordinances] seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a
discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of
each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not
only as to places, but as to persons. . . . The power given to them is not
confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to
their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance
nor restraint. . . .
....
. . . When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that
they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal
50
and arbitrary power.

In a surprising turn, the Justices then declined to strike down the law on its
face based on due process principles, and instead deemed the law unequally
applied to the Chinese:
[T]he cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown
establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular
class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever
may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by
the public authorities charged with their administration . . . with a mind so
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of
that equal protection of the laws which is secured . . . by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
51
United States.

Formally, the Justices stopped short of nullifying the law and commanding
that it be rewritten; they merely restored the complainants to their positions
absent such discriminatory behavior. Yet their hedge toward liberty was
strong enough that readers of Yick Wo remain uncertain as to the actual holding of the opinion—does it serve the cause of antidiscrimination, strike a
52
blow for liberty, or both?
It is possible to understand the High Court’s flirtation with the liberty
rationale as a stern message intended for the ears of policymakers charged
with drafting legal instruments: in the future, craft such ordinances more
carefully if you wish to gain the benefit of the presumption of
constitutionality normally enjoyed by legislation. The Justices may have
found it easier to accuse a low-level bureaucrat of racial discrimination than
to impute animus to an entire legislative body, but they also implied that
such lenience could not be expected in the future. The risk of insufficiently
50.

Id. at 366–70.

51.

Id. at 373.

52. Needless to say, our reading of the case differs from that of others. See generally Gabriel
J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1359
(arguing that Yick Wo is little more than a treaty case).
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cabined administrative discretion may prompt more skeptical review of
governmental actions, especially those rhetorically discredited like the
ordinance in Yick Wo.
Because the actor makes an uncertain commitment to a secondary rationale (often strongly implied but not always explicated), the
counterbalancing move is comparatively less constrained. As a result, hedging opens up a powerful way to invite further legal innovation by others
while leaving the possibility of firmer commitments for a later date. The
proposition that liberty can enhance equality in the long run (or vice versa),
asserted openly in Lawrence and merely hinted at in Yick Wo, can be best
appreciated in these terms.
C. Displacement
A person may engage in borrowing not with the hope of achieving a stable synthesis but rather with a goal of ensuring that the imported ideas
eventually come to dominate prevalent ideas and restructure the relationships among governing constitutional norms. We call such a project
displacement. It differs from transplantation in terms of motivation and effects. A single transplantation is usually undertaken for short-term or
fleeting reasons, whereas displacement fulfills transformative goals (whether ideological or institutional).
Displacement may be a net positive for the rule of law if a body of constitutional ideas has become stagnant and therefore has lost touch with
prevailing community sentiments or experience, or if an area of law has become riddled with exceptions and countermethods leading to substantial
confusion among specialists and ordinary people. On the other hand, a project of displacement may unsettle broadly held expectations, it could
provoke a pushback, and it risks producing an outcome that may be no bet53
ter than what is replaced. Displacement can be carried out by validating an
emerging trend, in which case the implementation costs of the tactic can be
minimized, or by reforming still-prevalent practices and beliefs, which may
incur exponential costs in the name of reform.
In a number of rulings in the last two decades or so, politicians, activists,
lawyers, and jurists have energetically drawn on equality ideas to give
54
meaning to the Religion Clauses. These efforts have produced a dramatic
53. For a comparative study of two projects of displacement in the First Amendment realm,
one involving the civil rights movement and another involving religious conservatism, see Tsai,
supra note 11, at 78–111.
54. Notions of equal dignity and respect have long been a part of the liberal tradition’s stance
toward religion, of course. Rather than ignoring those elements, our account highlights the ambitions of a monolithic equality approach. Even those who observe “the seeds of an equal protection
analysis” in early religious liberty jurisprudence acknowledge that ideas of equality have sometimes
been deliberately “imported” from different contexts into specific areas, with varying consequences.
See generally Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their
History, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 275, 277–78 (2006) (exploring language of equality in state constitutional
provisions and early judicial decisions protecting religious liberty).
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reordering of expectations as to the scope of rights and institutional obligations such that one could say that, for better or worse, the analytical
frameworks and vocabulary associated with equality have largely displaced
earlier readings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. In several
cases, treating religious believers differently from other social actors has
55
triggered charges of “hostility,” “animus,” and even “subordination.” To the
extent that equality or antidiscrimination are meant to supplant other conceptions of injury, we would say that the liberty approach has been
displaced by equality-based formulations.
In this instance, liberty ideas have been displaced by a particular brand
of equality, a restricted view that does not protect against laws that disproportiately affect protected groups. Of course, the major move came in
56
Employment Division v. Smith in 1990. There the Court abandoned the rule
that had, for some thirty years, treated incidental burdens on religious prac57
tice as presumptively unconstitutional. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Scalia announced that such burdens on religion would no longer be subject
to heightened scrutiny. Although laws that purposefully targeted religious
actors for special regulation would continue to trigger a compelling interest
test, general laws that merely had the effect of making observance more dif58
ficult would not.
A footnote suggested that the Smith decision was part of a broader shift
59
in the Court’s thinking. It cited Washington v. Davis, where the Court had
controversially ruled that the Equal Protection Clause offered only minimal
protection against laws or policies that, although neutral on their face, had
60
the incidental effect of disadvantaging protected classes. For instance, a
written employment test that happened to eliminate a disproportionate number of African Americans seeking to become police officers would no longer
occasion any particular constitutional concern, absent further evidence that
61
the test reflected a discriminatory purpose.
Smith ought to have counted as a turnabout, and many critics viewed it
62
that way. But Justice Scalia framed the decision differently. He argued that

55. See Tsai, supra note 11, at 100–08; see also Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1327–31 (2008).
56.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

57. Interestingly, Sherbert v. Verner also lifted its core concept from another area of law.
Justice Brennan looked to free speech cases for the strict scrutiny standard that was to become free
exercise law for thirty years. See 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963)).
58.

See Smith, 494 U.S. 872.

59.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

60.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. 229).

61.

Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.

62. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (criticizing Smith explicitly); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1990).
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it was actually the old rule that had been out of step—that it had been, in his
63
words, a “constitutional anomaly.” From Smith onward, incidental burdens
on free exercise would be handled just like laws that exerted a disparate racial impact. Explicitly importing the disparate impact rule from equal
protection helped the Court portray Smith as a restoration rather than a revo64
lution.
Scalia tried to extend this project of displacement even further in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. There, he argued in a separate
opinion that disparate impact claims ought to be presumptively unavailable
in the voting rights area, just as they are in free exercise and elsewhere in
65
equal protection. Generally applicable election regulations should not draw
any special sort of scrutiny, he argued, even if they have the effect of imposing disproportionate burdens on particular classes of voters. For Scalia,
therefore, Indiana’s voter identification requirement was permissible not
only because it did not impose a significant burden on a particular class of
voters, as the majority held, but also because, even if it had placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a defined group, the regulation was not driven
by a discriminatory purpose. In his words, “[a] voter complaining about [a
nondiscriminatory election] law’s effect on him has no valid equalprotection claim because, without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally
66
applicable law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional.” Two others—
67
Justice Alito and Justice Thomas—signed on to that argument.
63.

494 U.S. at 886.

64. More recently, Judge Fernandez of the Ninth Circuit expressed his preference for displacement in the Newdow case, a challenge to recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes
the phrase “under God”:
Were we to [choose among the many approaches to interpreting the Religion Clauses], the one
that appeals most to me, the one I think to be correct, is the concept that what the religion
clauses of the First Amendment require is neutrality; that those clauses are, in effect, an early
kind of equal protection provision and assure that government will neither discriminate for nor
discriminate against a religion or religions.

Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
Many of those who stress theories of neutrality, equal status, or equal dignity as the primary or
exclusive method of reading the Religion Clauses are undertaking a project of displacement. See
generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the
Constitution (2007); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal
Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
65. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
66.

Id.

67. Admittedly, the disparate impact rule Scalia was seeking to export came from an equal
protection decision. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). If voting rights doctrine is seen
as a subset of equal protection, then what Scalia was advocating might not count as borrowing. On
this reading, Scalia was simply seeking the consistent application of an idea within and throughout a
single, undifferentiated domain of constitutional law. However, we think that reading is not the most
plausible one. After all, voting rights law has taken on a degree of independence and specialization.
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Importantly for our purposes, Scalia was consciously seeking to further
his displacement project. Successfully importing the disparate impact rule
from other areas would make the majority’s approach to voting rights look
like a departure. According to Scalia’s story, it would “effectively turn back
decades of equal-protection jurisprudence” for courts to consider carving
out exemptions from election regulations for voters who are disproportion68
ately burdened by them. That was because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class,” and certainly not
69
when they fall on unprotected ones. In support of this proposition, Scalia
now could cite not only Washington v. Davis, but also Employment Division
70
v. Smith.
The Crawford plurality did not embrace this extension of the campaign
against disparate impact claims. Instead, it held that even “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” voting regulations would be subject to a balancing test,
under which a burden on the right to vote would be weighed against the
71
state’s justification. Nevertheless, Scalia’s arguments put pressure on protections against disparate impact in the voting rights area.
What distinguishes displacement from transplantation, in sum, are a
borrower’s motivation and the ultimate consequences of an appropriation
(what we call its yield). It is difficult to detect a desire to displace in a single
controversy, because identifying a displacement requires gauging the degree
to which an idea’s proponents favor a fundamental reordering. Within a
deliberative body, some members may be committed to a program of
displacement, while others could simply believe that a synthesis makes
sense in the context of a discrete dispute but not necessarily in others. A
strong pattern that authoritative actors establish or accept may be evidence
72
of an ongoing project of transformation.

See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201,
1201–02 (1996) (arguing that voting rights law is and should be distinct from the rest of equal protection doctrine). And, for an even longer period of time, the Religion Clauses have been treated as
relatively autonomous. To the degree that voting law is seen as distinct, Scalia can be seen as advocating a species of borrowing.
68.

Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

69.

Id.

70. Id. (citing both cases). Of course, the campaign to displace meaningful constitutional
protection for disparate impact is incomplete in other ways as well. For instance, speech law is not
completely insensitive to claims that laws burden expression, even if that is not their aim. United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (protecting incidental burdens on speech with a
form of intermediate scrutiny).
71.

Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616.

72. It is easy to foreswear such ambitions, yet it may be hard to know whether to credit a
disavowal. Specialists may be skeptical of limiting language, knowing that what was necessary to
achieve a resolution may in fact represent an unstable alliance. It is more difficult for the average
citizen to determine whether to take qualifying language seriously.
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D. Corruption
At this point, we address a darker set of motivations that can, in extreme
situations, infect an act of borrowing: appropriation may be conducted with
the goal of corrupting an area of law. When this happens, borrowing would
occur not for the sake of prompting a good faith reconsideration of the trajectory of the law, but instead for the purpose of confusing observers,
insulating a matter from accountability, or rendering a doctrine unusable by
practitioners. In each of these rare scenarios, borrowing to corrupt the law
would constitute an expression of bad faith and should be treated as harmful
to the rule of law.
Our examples help to describe this type of borrowing, though none of
them necessarily rises to the level of corruption. Justice Scalia raised the
specter of cultural incompatibility in two disputes where he found himself
73
on the losing end: once in Lawrence, and again in Roper v. Simmons. In
Lawrence, he objected to reliance on the law of “foreign nations” based on
the fact that Bowers itself was “devoid of any reliance on the views of a
74
‘wider civilization.’ ” While Scalia referred to foreign sources as “alien
law” in Roper, which barred the execution of juvenile offenders, most of his
objections in both cases were directed at what he believed to be the Supreme
75
Court’s lack of sincerity or consistency in drawing on external sources. As
for “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should
conform to the laws of the rest of the world”—he wrote, “[i]n fact the Court
76
itself does not believe it.”
77
Yet for all his reservations, he did not accuse the Court of corruption in
the sense that we have described. As in Lawrence, these and other concerns
78
are better classified as questions of fit. If Scalia thought the Court’s inconsistency was driven by a desire to make the law unusable, unstable, or
unworkable, he did not come out and say it. The closest he came was when

73.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).

74. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 576 (majority opinion)). For this reason, Justice Scalia deplored the majority’s “meaningless dicta.” Id. He also thought the reliance on foreign sources was “[d]angerous,” however,
because “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” Id.
(quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
Justice Scalia’s objections still did not represent a fundamental attack on constitutional borrowing,
but rather concern about judicial endorsement of fleeting attitudes. His concern reappeared later,
when he characterized reliance on Canadian law as little more than “judicial imposition” justified by
other countries’ exercise in judicial imposition. Id. at 604.
75.

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

76. Id. at 624. Among other things, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he Court has been oblivious
to the views of other countries when deciding how to interpret our Constitution’s requirement that
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .’ ” Id. at 625 (quoting U.S.
Const. amend. I). The same is true, he said, when it comes to abortion. Id.
77. We characterize these moves as borrowing in part because the proponent is not arguing
from precedent nor from analogy.
78.

See infra Section IV.A.
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he suggested that the majority opinion amounted to “the Justices’ own notion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so
79
henceforth in America.” We might say that the law had become corrupted
if an appropriation muddied the doctrine in the service of raw politics or
personal preference. Then perhaps we could conclude that an outgrowth of
law had become untenable or unusable. But that did not appear to be
Scalia’s primary concern.
We would need to know more, of course, to assess a charge of corruption. Are instances of borrowing defensible on their own terms or according
80
81
to some overarching metric? What does an act of appropriation yield?
Other factors are worth considering. The more dramatic the move and the
more serious its doctrinal ramifications, the more red flags it may raise. The
fact that Roper goes to great lengths to minimize, or even marginalize its
borrowing (or at least to keep its significance unsettled) cuts against a finding of corruption. So does the relative lack of novelty: it is hardly the first
time the Supreme Court has looked to foreign or international sources, and
there is even a basis for saying that the law of nations was originally con82
templated as a resource for federal law.
A more plausible case of corruption might be found in Chief Justice
Burger’s resort to “Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards” in Bowers
83
v. Hardwick. Never before had privacy jurisprudence turned so openly on
the content of religious injunctions. In fact, the opposite was true: core
precedents had abetted, in the name of privacy, an individual’s choice to
84
resist efforts to inculcate religious or sectarian norms. Although drawing
from natural law was once an accepted form of argumentation, the canons of

79.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also later wrote:

We must disregard the new reality that, to the extent our Eighth Amendment decisions constitute something more than a show of hands on the current Justices’ current personal views
about penology, they purport to be nothing more than a snapshot of American public opinion
at a particular point in time (with the timeframes now shortened to a mere 15 years).

Id. at 629. Here, too, the charge of corruption was no more than a passing suggestion, buried among
other concerns about methodology.
80. Justice Scalia contends, “The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all
these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners’
views as part of the reasoned basis of its decisions.” Id. at 627.
81.

See infra Section IV.D.

82. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (empowering Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (drawing on the practices of the “civilized nations of the world” to
interpret the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment”); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
83.

478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

84. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending rationale to unmarried
persons’ effort to resist “protection of morals”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (citing privacy concerns to aid individuals’ resistance of communal objections to contraception).
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particular faith traditions had for generations been treated as domains separate from secular law. In reaching for parochial standards to underpin the
state’s police power and categorically reject Hardwick’s privacy claim, Burger introduced a new element into the ongoing dispute over the nature and
scope of individual autonomy. The potential ramifications for constitutional
liberty alone rendered the move noteworthy.
Did Burger honestly believe that the legal text dovetailed with religious
doctrine? If so, why prefer expressions of disapproval from the Hebrew Bible over exhortations from the New Testament to treat social outcasts and
the politically vulnerable with equal respect? Again, we would need more
information to determine whether Burger acted with integrity. One might
ask, in comparable situations, whether the jurist reached for religious authority to interpret a constitutional provision. If not, an inference might be
drawn that he or she tried to complicate due process doctrine to foreclose a
line of argument for an entire group of people or to express his or her private
preferences in the guise of law. As for Bowers, the fact that natural law approaches to judicial interpretation had long been out of vogue and that no
other member of the Court was willing to endorse his concurring opinion
are not dispositive, though they certainly locate his approach at the margins
of jurisprudential practices.
III. A Defense of Borrowing
Over time, constitutional borrowing has been deployed to various ends
by advocates of all stripes. Yet despite that widespread acceptance, we think
that it is necessary to demand firmer grounding for the practice. Unexamined tradition or habit is no substitute for a principled defense.
Why, then, should anyone support borrowing? One rationale is that borrowing can promote certain rule-of-law values. It helps restore generality to
the law, it creates opportunities for strategic leveraging, it may facilitate accountability, and it fosters systemic strengthening. If these gains
predominate, they provide reason enough to legitimate the practice in a constitutional order.
Borrowing does not deserve support in every circumstance, of course. It
may occasionally do violence to the very virtues that render the practice
defensible in most situations. We flag some general dangers here and then,
in the next Part, we set out a framework for identifying the conditions under
which particular instances of borrowing retain or lose their attractiveness.
A. Generality
Constitutional borrowing tends to promote the development, over time,
of a general repertoire of doctrinal moves that are common to disparate areas of law. Lon Fuller once remarked that the “requirement of generality”
was “[t]he first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the
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governance of rules.” Officials, according to the generality principle,
should apply the law rather than resolve specific disputes according to per86
sonal inclination or the demands of justice in each instance anew.
Borrowing encourages a type of generality that may be wholesome for a
variety of other reasons, as well. It hinders hyperspecialization and thereby
facilitates participation by nonexperts. And wider involvement in lawmaking
can in turn promote democratic accountability. People who value legal consistency will have greater opportunities to press decisionmakers not to
exercise their power in patternless or idiosyncratic ways. Migration of legal
ideas may also break down outmoded categories, heighten awareness of the
limitations of context-specific adjudication, and encourage the search for
commonalities.
Perhaps most significantly, generality across areas of law can foster a
sense of fairness among litigants—a perception that comparable cases are
being treated comparably, even though they may fall into different doctrinal
categories. In other words, borrowing can foster a felt sense of evenhandedness by encouraging the spread of common methods and devices across
87
domains of constitutional discourse. For reasons like these, generality has
88
long been prized by those who seek to promote the rule of law. Yet few
have noticed that migration among legal fields can promote that quality.
89
Generality can, in turn, improve predictability. The intermingling of
constitutional ideas and mechanisms can give advocates a better sense of
85.

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46 (1964).

86. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy, 30 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1513, 1514 (2009) (describing “[a] core element (some might say the core) of the rule of law”
and citing Fuller, supra note 85).
87. So, for example, a Native American peyote user whose claim is denied on the ground
that drug laws had only an “incidental effect” on sacred practices might take comfort in the fact that
incidental discriminatory effects could not form the basis for an equal protection claim by other
complainants. See our discussion of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), supra text
accompanying notes 56–61, for further explanation.
88. Generality is an important component of the rule-of-law tradition. Along with other
characteristics, it is seen to distinguish rule-bound behavior from dictatorial or idiosyncratic decisionmaking. See Fuller, supra note 85, at 46–49; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 215–16
(1979); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 93, 97 (2004);
Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1514–15; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal
Theory, 2 Ratio Juris 79, 93–94 (1989).
When we invoke the rule of law here, we do not mean to deploy its thickest meaning, according to which government is required to adhere to a full-fledged conception of justice. Although
some thinkers have understood the rule of law that way, we adhere to a thinner meaning, according
to which a regime could be at once unjust and compliant with the rule of law. Cf. Greenawalt, supra
note 86; Waldron, supra. Constitutional borrowing is neutral as to substantive justice—it can be
deployed independent of more rigorous requirements of legal or political morality. Moreover, we do
not suggest that even a uniform and ubiquitous implementation of constitutional borrowing would
be sufficient to guarantee full governmental observance of the rule of law or any one of the values
associated with that tradition.
89. Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1515 (“[Officials who observe the rule-of-law value] legal
standards that are clear in their content and whose application to particular circumstances is (at least
for the most part) definite. . . . [This is what scholars have] called principled predictability.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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which forms of persuasion are likely to count, even in an unfamiliar area.
Some might predict that borrowing would undermine predictability by promoting endless possibilities. Yet its proponents would argue that the custom
90
has promoted a stable range of expectations. Over time, they would say,
borrowing has enabled lawyers and lawmakers to craft arguments that stand
a greater chance of success. Borrowers assist in harmonizing domains of
constitutional law, and improved coherence fosters a greater measure of cer91
tainty.
Consider the question of whether the government ought to be able to ex92
clude religious actors and entities from its support programs. For some,
that issue presents a strong temptation toward inconsistency. Often the same
people who believe that the government should not be able to selectively
deny aid to religious groups also believe that government should be able to
refuse to fund abortions even though it financially supports natural child93
birth. For them, the state ought to be prohibited from selectively defunding
the exercise of a constitutional right in the free exercise area, even though it
is permitted to do so when it comes to due process. Tropes that populate
these controversies include, on the one hand, the government-as-speaker
(facilitating state influence), and, on the other hand, the government-asforum-creator (working to limit government discretion). Inconsistency in the
use of these metaphors can be flagged as a refusal to borrow—and as a
threat to generality.
94
In Locke v. Davey, the tension between free exercise and due process
concepts was momentarily eased. There, the Court decided that a state could
95
refuse to finance certain religious activity. Washington State had created a
scholarship program that covered all proposed subjects of study, except de96
votional theology. In upholding the program, the Court lifted an idea from
its due process and free speech cases, namely the notion that when the government is funding and managing its own program, it enjoys wide discretion
to choose which activities to support, even if the unfunded conduct is constitutionally protected. “The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct

90. They might point to the spread of the disparate impact rule from equal protection to free
exercise, see supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text, or the general application of the undueburden standard to liberty provisions. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
91. Any benefit to calculability would of course be a matter of degree. We have seen that
constitutional actors may import in multifarious ways. Insofar as borrowing is indeterminate, then it
may or may not contribute to greater predictability about the substance of law.
92.

See generally Tebbe, supra note 55.

93. Id. at 1284 (citing Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 989, 989–90 (1991)).
94.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

95. A complicating factor, which the Davey Court stressed, was that the legislature made this
programmatic decision to comply with Washington state’s Constitution, which had been construed
by the state’s highest court to prohibit indirect funding of religious training.
96.

Davey, 540 U.S. at 715.
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category of instruction,” Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, characterizing
the issue as a matter of curricular control rather than the creation of an ex98
pressive forum. The Davey Court’s implicit debt to the abortion cases was
99
“unmistakable,” as one prominent commentator put it. Here, constitutional
100
borrowing arguably exerted pressure toward generality.
Our attention to evenness also suggests a way to appraise improper uses
of borrowing, as we will explain further in Part IV. When jurists reference
distant ideas not in a manner that furthers consistency across legal doctrines,
but instead in a way that creates anomalies, damage to the rule of law can
result. Think of Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Ten Commandments case
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, where he argued that government
101
ought to be able to publicly honor “a single Creator.” Allowing open acknowledgment of monotheism would have meant a turnabout, he realized,
because it would have countermanded the Supreme Court’s long-standing
prohibition on government endorsement of religion, as well as the even
102
more ancient requirement of neutrality among faiths. In his defense, Scalia
pointed to other areas in which the Court had happily disturbed
103
settled doctrine, specifically voting rights and criminal procedure. That
revealing gesture highlighted the transformative character of what Scalia
was trying to accomplish. For him, these other moments of judicial creativity served as prototypes for action. So although borrowing often promotes
legal consistency, it can also highlight the damage that a move, whether accomplished or merely proposed, may inflict on generality in the law.

97.

Id. at 721.

98.

Id. at 720 n.3.

99. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology Scholarships,
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 176 (2004).
100. Of course the dissent also had an argument for consistency. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 726
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Our point, however, is that both majority and dissent were employing borrowing in ways that would bolster methodological and conceptual consistency—either harmony
with liberty-based due process cases (for the majority) or harmony with equality-based antidiscrimination ideas (in the case of the dissent).
101. 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment
of a religion.”); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
103. Id. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[This Court has] found unconstitutional bicameral
state legislatures of a sort that had existed since the beginning of the Republic. . . . [T]he Court has
not shrunk from invalidating aspects of criminal procedure and penology of similar vintage.” (citing
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))).
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B. Empowerment
A related point in favor of constitutional borrowing is that the practice
promises to foster wider participation in the maintenance of constitutional
norms. Once a regime agrees to govern by law, it presents opportunities for
legal actors to exploit contradictions and inconsistencies. And to the degree
that borrowing promotes values associated with the rule of law by highlighting constitutional ideas, generalizing them, and facilitating their use, it will
also enable advocates to find creative uses for those ideas.
In other words, borrowing may promote empowerment in several related
ways. First, an environment in which borrowing is tolerated encourages
constitutional actors to understand that they can—and indeed, must—take
matters into their own hands if organizing values are to emerge and endure.
Second, it rewards syntheses of different areas of law, thereby advancing
holistic thinking. Third, borrowing presents advocates with a practical way
of making connections between policy objectives and long-term interests,
namely by leveraging one idea to develop another.
Borrowing begets further borrowing. A robust custom of importation
creates possibilities for constitutional actors to strategically leverage ascendant concepts, techniques, or tropes for use in new domains. Because even
one instance of borrowing lends a legal device currency beyond its original
context, it empowers advocates to press for a second and third migration.
Even people who find themselves regularly in opposition to the prevailing
judicial mood nevertheless may be able to redeploy a widespread legal technique in a strategic manner.
Perhaps the best contemporary example of empowerment is the effort of
progressive legal scholars to deploy concepts associated with individual liberty in the service of an egalitarian vision. Recently, Jack Balkin and Reva
Siegel have warned against reliance on the tiers-of-scrutiny framework
originally associated with equal protection; instead, they have advocated
forms of legal argumentation drawn from the Court’s liberty jurisprudence,
104
particularly its speech and due process cases. Protecting the ability of all
people to pursue their divergent life plans may also ensure that all people
105
enjoy the status of full citizenship. And protecting liberty for all can serve
egalitarianism without generating the sort of legal backlash that can accompany more transparent attempts to redistribute opportunities to subordinate
106
groups. So these scholars have pressed legal activists to take advantage of
the Court’s recent receptivity to liberty-oriented claims—in areas such as
speech, criminal procedure, and due process—in the service of promoting

104.

Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7.

105.

See id. at 99–100.

106. Id. at 98. One mechanism that holds particular promise for their vision of “redemptive
constitutionalism” is the designation of a set of fundamental interests—in travel, voting, access to
justice, and the like—that the Court has said cannot be distributed unequally along class lines. See
id. at 98–100.
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the full citizenship rights of women, cultural minorities, and religious
groups. Balkin and Siegel have also urged jurists to reconstruct the Equal
Protection Clause by “borrow[ing]” from statutes concerning employment,
jury service, and voting rights, the use of rebuttable presumptions of illegality for government policies that work a disparate impact on subordinated
107
groups.
Likewise, Kenji Yoshino has drawn attention to a new sort of equal protection violation, where people are subordinated not because of their
membership in a disfavored group, but instead because they engage in conduct that is particularly closely identified with the group’s distinctive
108
attributes. So, for instance, employers sometimes disfavor not all African
109
American women, but only women who wear cornrows. Although courts
have not consistently protected against this sort of hybrid inequality,
Yoshino applauds the willingness of certain courts to disallow it, and he encourages the migration of their ideas. When in Tennessee v. Lane the
Supreme Court held that Congress could require states to make its courthouse’s wheelchair accessible, it framed the issue not as a matter of
protecting a subordinate group, but instead said that all people—disabled or
110
otherwise—have a due process “right of access to the courts.” That move
was similar to the way the Court had, just a year earlier, struck down the
Texas sodomy statute in Lawrence not only in order to protect a right to intimate sexual conduct enjoyed by all citizens, but also to protect gay and
lesbian citizens. Yoshino applauds the liberty rationale in Lane, just as in
Lawrence, and he encourages the further spread of that particular framework
for understanding and deciding civil rights cases. He issues a strategic call
for future litigants and lawyers to style their claims not in terms of equality
for members of disfavored groups, but in the language of liberty interests
111
shared by all citizens alike. That deployment of due process doctrine in
the service of antisubordination could be seen as a prominent example of the
phenomenon we are tracking.
Constitutional borrowing is especially empowering because it is agnostic to political ideology. Think, for instance, of the way that lawyers
representing religious conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s were able to
exploit the trope of discrimination in order to depict their clients—often
107.

Id. at 107.

108.

Yoshino, supra note 7 (describing “the new discrimination”).

109. Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 131–34
(2006) (discussing Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (1981)). Cornrows are a braided
hairstyle that is particularly closely associated with certain aspects of African American culture.
Yoshino predicts that under this new civil rights paradigm, courts should extend protections not on
the basis of membership in subordinate groups but instead in order to encourage the development of
human capacities by all individuals.
110.

541 U.S. 509, 523, 531–33 (2004).

111. See Yoshino, supra note 109. Similarly, one of us has suggested that it is possible to use
the Court’s abortion funding decisions in order to make conceptual space for the government’s refusal to fund religious groups on equal terms with others. See Tebbe, supra note 55.
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members of large religious communities—as victims of just that sort of go112
vernmental oppression. That rhetorical strategy contributed to decisions
protecting the right of religious speakers to access certain public forums,
such as school buildings after hours, on equal terms with nonreligious
113
community groups. In this respect, the substantive and rhetorical achievements of the civil rights movement empowered later actors, who may have
seen the world in very different terms and pursued different ideological objectives.
Think too of how defenders of federalism have deployed the practice. A
controversial but somewhat successful strategy has involved importing the
language of equality into domains such as the Commerce Clause and Eleventh Amendment. To magnify the authority of states, advocates have taken
to describing state interests in terms of equal “dignity,” “respect,” and even
114
“trust.” This innovation has not only permeated discussions immediately
115
before the Supreme Court, it has also empowered states (and states’ rights
proponents more broadly) to surmount various doctrinal impediments to the
cause of federalism. In sum, strategic leveraging occupies a place in the
rule-of-law tradition because it is seen to provide limited but real protection
against governmental caprice, and because it offers that protection to groups
with varying commitments.
When a state commits itself to the rule of law, it does not guarantee that
the legal rules it adopts will be just or wise. Yet even an unjust state that
claims to govern by law implicitly agrees to obey the rules it has itself established, even if that will result in occasional defeats. In Jeremy Waldron’s
words: “In an oppressive regime which does respect the rule of law, there
will be at least some values and principles in the official culture to which the
citizen can appeal in his complaints about injustice, and some tensions
116
which he can exploit to embarrass the regime.” Granted, constitutional
borrowing may promote strategic leveraging more weakly than other legal
112. Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—And What
We Should Do About It 206, 207–12 (2005).
113. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–31 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).
114. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[States] are not relegated to the
role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority,
of sovereignty.”). More oddly, in the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions, the
Justices have emphasized a state’s right to be free from “discrimination” rather than the federal
government’s prerogative in regulating interstate trade. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
115. During oral arguments over whether Section Five of the Voting Rights Act is consistent
with our constitutional design, Justice Kennedy argued that the preclearance provision offended the
“sovereign dignity” of states, which are not “trusted” to behave when it comes to the commands of
equality. He, and presumably others, were troubled by “this differentiation between the states.”
Adam Liptak, Skepticism at the Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A16.
See generally Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental
“States’ Rights”, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 213 (2004).
116.

Waldron, supra note 88, at 93–94.
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practices. Moreover, borrowing is relatively indeterminate, since the available sources for any particular borrowing will be multifarious. Yet to the
degree that the practice promotes values associated with the rule of law by
generalizing constitutional ideas and making them widely available, it may
open up opportunities for advocates to find creative uses in one context for
methodological moves created in some other domain. In our view, constitutional borrowing does more to foster such productive interactions than it
does to shut them down.
C. Accountability
Under the right circumstances, borrowing also may heighten the law’s accountability to the people affected by its dictates. Once a mechanism has
become widespread and institutionally entrenched, a failure or refusal to adopt
it becomes more visible. In other words, the migration of a stable repertoire of
moves over several domains will make a subsequent refusal to adopt that repertoire—or the introduction of a new technique—appear anomalous rather
than innocuous. Conversely, constitutional actors may be asked to answer for
an affirmative act of importation, particularly when that act disturbs existing
ways of working in a particular area. The fact that the new element hails from
another area of constitutional law makes it more visible. Either way, the
prevalence of borrowing can heighten the salience of certain legal moves,
making them available for commentary and critique. There may be costs, to
be sure—unused ideas can become unusable, and popular ideas can acquire
undeserved priority—yet the basic intuition seems correct that borrowing can
facilitate awareness of, and perhaps even greater vigilance over, developments
in the law.
Consider two instances in which the Court abandoned or neglected its
strict scrutiny framework, and the public reactions that they drew. Both cases involved the complex crossover between areas of law associated with
liberty and equality that we have been tracking throughout this Article. And
both show how persistent borrowing can expose a subsequent departure.
Think first of Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court discontinued heightened scrutiny of laws that incidentally burdened religious
117
freedom. Because strict scrutiny was a familiar mechanism when Smith
was decided, having come to free exercise law from equal protection and
free speech cases, and because the Court had been employing that mechanism for roughly three decades in its free exercise doctrine itself, the
decision to abandon it drew attention. Outcry was heard in Congress, which
attempted to reinstitute the strict scrutiny regime as a statutory matter. It first
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and then, after
118
that law was partially invalidated, Congress enacted the Religious Land

117.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

118.

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Without question,
Congress got involved because it disagreed with the Smith Court’s decision
120
to abandon the compelling interest test, which had become widespread.
Roughly a dozen states similarly expressed discontent with the turnabout by
121
passing state-level analogues to RFRA.
Think second of Lawrence, where the Court deemphasized the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny approach. The Court declined to apply the
compelling government interest test, which had already spread from equal
protection to domains associated more closely with liberty or autonomy,
122
including due process. Here, too, the Court’s refusal to adopt a formal
123
presumption of unconstitutionality generated considerable debate. We say
this quite aside from any critique or defense of that aspect of Lawrence. Our
object is simply to show that in an era in which constitutional borrowing is
as customary as it is today, a refusal (or decision) to import a prevalent legal
tool can serve a deliberative function.
Under conditions where legal techniques can be expected to be used
with some frequency, in sum, departures from those approaches are easier to
spot and therefore can draw the sort of public scrutiny and dialogue that
helps to keep the judiciary faithful to its own professional and institutional
standards. Valuing that sort of accountability comports with the more general rule-of-law notion that government should not act in an arbitrary

119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). For an account of the history leading up to
RLUIPA, as well as the current state of the constitutional rules, see Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and
the Problem of Symmetry, 56 Hastings L.J. 699, 705–11, 725–27 (2005).
120. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (setting out
Congress’s finding that “in [Smith] the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion” and
explaining that a purpose of RFRA is “to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”).
121. Of course the Court itself claimed that it was in fact acting to eliminate a “constitutional
anomaly”—the presumption of unconstitutionality for disparate impact claims. See supra Section II.C.
On that account, it was not Smith itself that stood out, but instead the free exercise rule that had been in
place previously. After all, as the Smith Court pointed out, disparate impact claims no longer drew strict
scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Recently, Justice Scalia tried unsuccessfully to export this disparate impact rule to the area of voting rights, as well.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
122. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas [sodomy] statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”); see also id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has not subjected the Texas
sodomy law to strict scrutiny, and chiding the majority for applying “an unheard-of form of rationalbasis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case”).
123. The dominant reaction was not chiefly disapproval, as with Smith, but instead a more evenhanded sort of interest. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, 2002–2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21; Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
1103 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1447 (2004); Cass R.
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 27; Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004).
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124

manner. Now holding the judiciary to its own standards is not the same
thing as making it accountable to public opinion in the manner that politicians are. Justices may well continue to buck public sentiment, as they did
in Smith, but they will do so with fuller awareness of the possible cost to the
Court’s legitimacy.
D. Reinforcement
So far we have been discussing the benefits of borrowing by focusing on
the borrower and persons directly affected by official action. But there may
be other beneficial effects as well. Specifically, an act of appropriation can
not only shore up the target area of law, but also can work to legitimate or
reinforce the legal source. Consequently, and perhaps most importantly, a
culture of borrowing can strengthen the constitutional system as a whole. In
other words, when a constitutional actor lifts a mechanism from domain X
for use in domain Y that act may not only bolster domain Y in the intended
way, but might also enhance the credibility of the mechanism within domain
X, as well as the credibility of domain X as a whole. When that happens,
borrowing can also have systemic effects because the wider network of
foundational ideas may be reinforced. That can not only stabilize the domains of substantive law immediately involved—X and Y—but it can also
bring somewhat greater coherence to legal discourses more generally. Of
course systemic reinforcement is not necessary or automatic in all cases, nor
is it invariably good, but it is an interesting consequence of many such exchanges.
Something like that happened in Lawrence. There the Court looked to
substantive due process decisions in order to protect intimate conduct, particularly within the home. That move worked to legitimate the right of
intimate conduct and association developed in cases like Griswold v. Con125
126
127
necticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and especially Roe v. Wade and Planned
128
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Those cases had been
under sustained attack, and their logic and vitality had been threatened by
129
Bowers v. Hardwick, by the time the Court turned to the Texas sodomy
law. Moreover, the Lawrence Court went the additional step of appropriating
from the domain of equality. In the process of reinforcing Y, they also
thereby legitimated X in the form of antidiscrimination rationales and the

124.

Tamanaha, supra note 88, at 95; Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 1514.

125.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

126.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

127.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

128.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

129.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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130

decision of Romer v. Evans, even without directly saying so. This dynamic
of mutual reinforcement should not be understated. And in that particular
context, the move put added pressure on earlier statements of the Court that
sexual orientation could not define a suspect class.
Think too of the migration of the disparate impact rule from Washington
131
132
v. Davis and equal protection to Employment Division v. Smith and free
exercise. That appropriation likewise not only justified a rewriting of free
exercise law—enabling the Court to characterize the old rule as “a constitu133
tional anomaly” —but also shored up an approach to equal protection that
134
has seen its share of high-profile criticism. To the degree that the Court
could proliferate the idea that a presumption of unconstitutionality should
only follow a showing of discriminatory treatment, it could more convincingly describe the old disparate impact approach as a “constitutional
135
anomaly.”
Whether or not one approves of the Court’s decision in either of these
examples, the point is this: when constitutional actors engage in borrowing,
they may fortify not only the area of law into which the idea is imported, but
also the legal source. So the Lawrence Court strengthened the principle of
equal dignity when it brought that idea to bear on the problem of intimate
association, and the Smith Court lent additional credence to its rejection of
disparate impact claims in equal protection when it extended that refusal to
free exercise. What is more, the strengthening impacts the system of constitutional mechanisms more generally. There is a ripple effect of mutual
reinforcements across constitutional law as a whole. People come to see the
field as united by a common interpretive focus, of course—the text of the
Constitution—but also by an interlocking set of techniques, ideas, sources,
and mechanisms.
IV. Criteria for Evaluation
Now that we have a sense of some of the forms that constitutional borrowing can take, as well as an appreciation of its virtues, it becomes

130. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Court relied on an equal protection rationale to strike
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited special protections in state and
local laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id.
131.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

132.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

133.

Id. at 886.

134. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1137–38 (1997) (articulating a sustained
critique of the rule of Davis). Congress too has adopted the disparate impact approach in several
statutes, despite the Court’s critique of that rule in its equal protection cases. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–(k)(1)(A) (2006).
135. One could imagine, for instance, an imminent attack on the O’Brien test, which applies
heightened scrutiny to laws that incidentally burden speech. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376–77 (1968).
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possible to construct a framework for evaluating incidences of borrowing.
Below we explicate four evaluative tools: (a) fit; (b) transparency; (c) completeness; and (d) yield. These criteria implement basic assumptions about
the rule of law. First, the notion of fit complies with the sense that the law’s
substance (including borrowed material) should be compatible with existing
arrangements. Second, a preference for transparency endorses the expectation that arguments appeal to reason and further a public purpose. Third,
completeness is related to substantive fidelity and deliberative values, necessary features of a purposively designed legal system. Fourth, the idea of
yield acknowledges that above all, the rule of law must solve problems of
practical governance (and therefore, an act of borrowing must not frustrate
self-rule but aid it in some fashion).
Once borrowing is understood as a presumptively legitimate practice—a
general acceptance that the previous Part tried to promote—most concerns
that arise have to do with how well particular legal ideas fit together; how
open and notorious the borrowing is; what is lifted and what is left behind;
and what, as a practical matter, that creative act yields.
A. Fit
Questions of fit arise with greatest urgency when one engages in an
original act of transplantation, but subsidiary concerns about fit can also
linger even when two domains are already associated in the public imagination or treated as entwined in legal practice. How well different bodies of
constitutional knowledge fit together turns on a number of factors, including: (1) whether linkages between the areas already exist (synergy), and the
duration of any connections (novelty); (2) what the justifications for the appropriation are and how readily they might be embraced by specialists and
average citizens (persuasiveness); (3) how the synthesized values are applied
to the dispute at hand (practical yield); and (4) whether and how other background conditions underlie a combination of ideas (resource constraints,
social environment, and the like).
137
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court declared the execution of juveniles to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy devoted a separate section to the experience of the United
Kingdom, as well as Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which bars capital punishment for crimes committed
138
while a person is under the age of eighteen. Anticipating concerns of fit,
136. Bear in mind that such evaluative criteria should be used in conjunction with more traditional means of assessing legal justifications rather than replacing them. What we offer are methods
of reaching normative judgments about the quality of borrowing to supplement existing methods for
assessing an interpretation of the Constitution.
137.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).

138. Id. at 576–78. The fact that the United States has not ratified the Convention did not
stand in the way of the Roper Court’s calibrated appropriation of that legal source to bolster its
Eighth Amendment rationale. This is because the Court gave great weight to the fact that “every
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Kennedy pursued a four-fold response. First, he emphasized a shared AngloAmerican heritage: “The United Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of
the Eighth Amendment’s own origins[,]” namely, the English Declaration of
139
Rights of 1689. Second, he suggested that certain constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, contemplate borrowing, particularly
140
if judicial tradition has already ratified such an approach. Third, he relied
on the decisive weight of world opinion. Repeatedly, Kennedy stressed the
141
“historic ties” and overlap between the “affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples” and “the centrality of those same
142
rights within our own heritage of freedom.” Fourth, he softened any precedential effect of the borrowing by indicating that such extraneous sources
143
are “not . . . controlling.” Recognition of interconnected traditions among
democratic nations, Kennedy argued, “does not lessen our fidelity to the
144
Constitution or our pride in its origins.”
Justice Scalia took aim at the Roper majority, focusing on questions of
fit. He attacked “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American
145
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world.” First, he suggested that appropriation should be rejected out of hand for lack of sincerity
or consistency. On numerous occasions, Scalia pointed out, the High Court
has expressly gone against the grain of world opinion in establishing some
146
constitutional standard. He pointed to the First Amendment as an example
of an area where the Court has been “oblivious to the views of other coun147
tries.” Having argued for the distinctiveness of American legal culture, he
then disputed whether it made sense to infuse American law with English
law, in light of “the United Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurispru-

country in the world has ratified [the Convention] save for the United States and Somalia,” and no
country ratifying the instrument has entered a reservation with respect to the prohibition on juvenile
executions. Id. at 576.
139.

Id. at 577.

140. Id. at 575 (“[A]t least from the time of the Court’s decision in [Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958)], the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ”). Justice O’Connor, who dissented on the ground that no national consensus could be
discerned against capital punishment for juveniles, nevertheless agreed that “the special character of
the Eighth Amendment, which . . . draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized
society[,]” justifies consideration of foreign and international sources. Id. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
141.

Id. at 577 (majority opinion).

142.

Id. at 578.

143.

Id. at 575.

144.

Id. at 578.

145.

Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

146.

See id. at 624–26.

147.

Id. at 625.
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dence of European courts dominated by continental jurists—a legal, politi148
cal, and social culture quite different from our own.”
Scalia’s objections are best classified as arguments about fit, for he implicitly acknowledged the permeability, at some level, of all legal systems.
Justices in the majority and the dissent assumed the legitimacy of borrowing
as a practice. They simply disagreed about whether the tool should be used
in the case at bar. Some of the dispute had to do with the consequences of
borrowing: Scalia believed that it was being deployed “to set aside [a] centuries-old American practice” and might lead to the displacement of
149
American law by foreign law; the Roper majority thought it did no more
150
than “underscore[]” existing “rights within our own heritage of freedom.”
Putting to one side the merits of these arguments, their intensity illustrates the seriousness with which questions of fit are often taken. The
connections between American law and that of other communities remain
contested. Whatever the right answer may be in any particular case, we
think the rule of law requires that material taken across boundaries bear a
defensible relationship to existing cultural practices and political commitments.
Consider again the First Amendment. It is sometimes said that “today
[the Religion Clauses] are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and
equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith
151
such as Islam or Judaism.’ ” The endorsement test pioneered by Justice
O’Connor takes the incorporation of equality into religious liberty law a step
further. Under that approach, the salient question becomes whether the state’s
action with respect to religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
152
community.”
But questions of fit continue to hound the endorsement test. For one, it
is not apparent whether the endorsement approach should be a supplemental
test or should replace other methods of assessing religion claims. There remains significant dispute over whether a dignitary approach can truly
capture the full range of interests identified by the First Amendment. Does
equal access to resources, a solution that generally accompanies the equality
model, capture all objections to government support of churches and religious organizations? All of these questions in fact suggest there remain
crucial, but not always fully worked out, connections between equality and
liberty.

148.

Id. at 626–27.

149.

Id. at 628.

150.

Id. at 578 (majority opinion).

151. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989)
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).
152.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Now that the language of equality saturates debate over the Religion
Clauses, a pressing question of fit today concerns the point at which “differentiation” becomes “discrimination.” To this point, adjudicators have
occasionally engaged in the overheated rhetoric of equality when they invalidate state action, rather than systematically theorizing the circumstances
under which treating religious and nonreligious activity differently should
153
rise to a matter of substantive justice. For instance, in Good News Club v.
154
Milford Central School District, the Justices struck down a school policy
that opened up a public school after hours for “social, civic, or recreational
155
156
use” but not for religious activities. Along the way, Justice Thomas ridiculed the school’s position as “a modified heckler’s veto,” evoking the
1960s in which African American protestors were cruelly attacked by private citizens while states utilized various techniques to shut down
157
demonstrations. Harry Kalven described the notion of the “Heckler’s
Veto” this way: “If the police can silence the speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough, get
158
the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.”
Should the state’s action in this instance be understood as “discrimination” either in the sense that it unjustifiably burdens or stigmatizes someone,
or in the sense that the state is expressing hostility toward a private message? If so, is it discrimination on par with the kinds of subordinating
programs of the past against racial minorities and women, or does reaching
such a constitutional judgment require considerations beyond the idea that a
159
party is treated differently?
When the language of equality or speech (here, both) is brought to bear
on a problem, it frames a matter in terms of access, thereby marginalizing
more substantive concerns that might arise. Once the state is required to
make such property management decisions on an equal basis, for fear of
expressing animus, can it bar other community groups, such as the Aryan
160
Youth, from using school grounds after hours? Perhaps public officials
ought to retain the ability to decide not to facilitate speech by such groups.
There might be an argument that the two scenarios can be distinguished on
the ground that religious groups enjoy a privileged constitutional status visà-vis other groups, though this answer is not obvious if the speech part of
153. Typically, no Establishment Clause injury will be heard if subsidies or other public resources are equally available.
154.

533 U.S. 98 (2001).

155.

Good News, 533 U.S. at 109.

156.

Id. at 111–12.

157.

Id. at 119.

158.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 140 (1965).

159. For an argument that exclusions from support programs amount to impermissible discrimination less often than is supposed, see Tebbe, supra note 55.
160. For a defense of state discretion to support nonreligious actors without also aiding religious ones, see id. at 1271–82.
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the equation is taken seriously—for, under free speech principles, even the
despised are entitled to some opportunity to congregate and make them161
selves heard.
We raise this example not because we necessarily disagree with where
162
the Justices have drawn the line. Every adjudicative act entails trade-offs,
and it seems defensible to demand, at least presumptively, equal access to
163
public resources. After all, the school could always get out of the business
of serving as after-hours property manager. Yet something valuable could be
lost by putting a school in such an either-or position. And that, ultimately, is
our point: wrapping a resource allocation question in the language of equality can raise as many questions as it answers.
B. Transparency
It may be profitable to evaluate an instance of constitutional borrowing
according to how open and notorious it is. Appropriation is overt if the
synthesis is undertaken self-consciously or systematically, if it cites to or
quotes from accepted sources, or if it openly considers and rejects
alternative formulations. A combination is covert if it is made without
revealing its genesis or evolution, if it is presented as well-established
despite the lack of a pedigree, or if it is made casually rather than
painstakingly.
Consider the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (“SJC”) decision
164
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, which provides an example
of intersystem borrowing (incorporating federal law into state law) as well
as interdomain appropriation (appealing to equality for the sake of liberty).
Invalidating an opposite-sex marriage statute on equal protection grounds,
the Justices prominently quoted from Lawrence v. Texas to affirm their “ob165
ligation . . . to define the liberty of all.” Throughout, the SJC couched the
equality question as one enveloped in a “core concept of common human
166
dignity,” or as conjoined principles of “respect for individual autonomy

161. Political speech could likely be excluded in toto, but closing school doors only to a disfavored political perspective would be harder under existing law.
162. For an argument that the Good News Court drew the line in the wrong place because it
failed to take into account the fact that an outside group was seeking to proselytize in an elementary
school, see 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness 206 (2008).
163. But cf. Tebbe, supra note 55 (arguing that government exclusion of religious groups from
support ought to be constitutional more often than is commonly supposed). We note that, at least in
the public school context, the Equal Access Act makes many of these questions less practical than
theoretical by requiring equal treatment of school-sponsored student groups.
164.

798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

165.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).

166.

Id.
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167

and equality under law.” These ideas were expressed in Lawrence as an
exposition of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in the judgment of the SJC,
they were guaranteed to a greater degree by the Massachusetts Constitution.
The hybrid nature of Goodridge was underscored by the separate concurrence of Justice Greaney, who thought the same outcome could have been
168
“more directly resolved using traditional equal protection analysis.”
The SJC made it obvious that the institution was adopting as its own—
and adapting—the Lawrence Court’s assertion that “[e]quality of treatment
and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a deci169
sion on the latter point advances both interests.” In the process, the SJC
replayed the U.S. Supreme Court’s own hedge between liberty and equality.
Moreover, because the court quoted directly from Lawrence and pointed out
that the precise question of gay marriage was left open in that decision, it
was also apparent that the state court was, on its own initiative, going farther
than the Lawrence Court had.
Because Goodridge appropriated ideas of liberty (articulated by others)
for the sake of equality and did so overtly, a reader is shown every step of
the reasoning process. Transparency may invite disagreement by showing
where the movable components of an argument are, thus exposing them to
attack and possible ridicule. But opting for transparency also arguably reduces the tensions surrounding a controversial decision by acknowledging
the hard choices facing a decisionmaker. Overt borrowing invites the citizen
to walk along with the jurist in an exploration of constitutional possibilities,
and the citizen is afforded the opportunity to embrace or reject the synthesis
proffered. One could conclude that the SJC had no business drawing on a
liberty case to adjudicate an equality controversy, or one could agree with
the general approach but disagree with how the ideas were interwoven. At
all events, the point is that signposting the appropriation can fill a deliberative function, even if it ends up prompting more intense disagreement in the
short run.

167. Id. at 949; see also id. at 959 (“Whether and whom to marry, how to express sexual
intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family—these are among the most basic of every
individual’s liberty and due process rights.”).
168. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring). The California Supreme Court’s decision that the
state’s same sex-marriage ban also contains an overt instance of borrowing. There is no question that
the ruling’s equality rationale is firmly grounded in the state constitution, California legal precedents, and even social transformations in the state regarding public attitudes toward homosexuality.
Even so, the state court justices employed Lawrence as a model for answering the interpretive question. Citing the case directly, and calling it “somewhat analogous,” they pointed to its repudiation of
Bowers as proof that constitutional rights “properly should be understood in a broader and more
neutral fashion so as to focus upon the substance of the interests that the constitutional right is intended to protect.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 421 (Cal. 2008) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 565–77).
169. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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On other occasions, constitutional borrowing is conducted more covertly, without identifying a particular source, and without underscoring the
interpretive innovation that might be involved. It might consist of language,
reasons, or ideas that suffuse an opinion rather than a single, focused,
prominent moment of appropriation. Consider the criminal procedure deci170
sion, Chambers v. Florida, which deemed the interrogation of several
black youths over the course of several days and nights to be a denial of due
process of law, in the process throwing out confessions made under du171
ress. The defendants had made both liberty and equality arguments, and
the Justices chose to ignore the claims sounding in racial inequality, at least
172
formally.
Yet the indications of racial injustice were too powerful to deny: in their
search for a killer, police engaged in a racial dragnet, detaining and
173
Justice Black’s
questioning upwards of forty African Americans.
integration of the ideas of equality and liberty proved to be sophisticated.
First, the opinion recounted the facts in such a way that left little doubt of the
racially charged atmosphere or of the sheriff’s immediate focus on black
174
suspects. Second, Black seamlessly combined rationales of liberty and
equality in recounting the background and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment: “Tyrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial
criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of
helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who
175
would not conform and who resisted tyranny.” In other words, protecting
liberty by scrupulously enforcing fair procedures also made state actions
176
“free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power.” Though the
opinion did not directly accuse any of the state actors in this case of racial
discrimination, Black insisted over and over that the ruling would
nevertheless aid “the poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the
177
friendless, and the powerless.” And in the application of these principles to
the facts at hand, he referred to the defendants as “ignorant young colored
170.

309 U.S. 227 (1940).

171.

Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241.

172. Id.; see Brief in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chambers v. Florida, No.
195, July 11, 1939, at 25, 28 (contending that defendants’ equal protection and due process rights
were violated because the evidence was tainted by “illegal influences,” including that their interrogator threatened to “turn[] them over to lynchers if they changed their stories”). Marshall’s brief
may have invited this strategy by declining to make race-based arguments in their strongest form,
yet subtly weaving perceived inequities into his liberty arguments.
173.

Chambers, 309 U.S. at 229.

174. The Broward County Sheriff testified that he was rounding up blacks and taking them to
the jail in Dade County “to escape a mob.” Id. at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deputies
arrested individuals without warrants and questioned them, eventually releasing everyone but the
accused. The ruling repeatedly referred to “the haunting fear of mob violence.” Id. at 240.
175.

Id. at 236.

176.

Id. at 227.

177.

Id. at 238.
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tenant farmers” questioned “by state officers and other white citizens.”
Chambers ended with a ringing endorsement of judicial review “for the
benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution—of whatever race,
179
creed or persuasion.”
The Court has also engaged in veiled borrowing in order to encourage a
liberty-oriented template for thinking about a problem. Strangely, the best
recent example comes from free exercise law, even though that area has seen
some of the most aggressive efforts to displace liberty rules with an equality
180
181
framework, as we described above. In Locke v. Davey the Court softened
its exclusive focus on evenhandedness and began to speak in terms that subtly—but unmistakably—drew on liberty-oriented areas of constitutional law,
182
particularly free speech and due process. At hand was the question of
whether a state could establish a college scholarship that would be available
to all students who met certain criteria, except those who planned to major
183
in the study of religion from a faith perspective. At first, the scholarship
seemed to involve just the sort of facial discrimination on the basis of religion that the Smith Court had said would remain presumptively invalid. Yet
the Davey Court upheld the program without any particularly rigorous examination. It chiefly reasoned that Davey had not been excessively burdened
184
when the state denied him a subsidy.
In the course of his majority opinion in Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that when the government establishes a subsidy program, it is
entitled to decide which activities it wishes to fund and which ones it does
185
not. Ordinary readers would not have placed any particular weight on that
formulation. But to specialists, the statement carried covert significance.
178.

Id.

179. Id. at 241. Without having to take a firm position in the ongoing debate at that time over
whether more aggressive judicial review was authorized when state action harmed a discrete and
insular minority, Chambers rhetorically inclined in that direction.
A similar instance of indirection occurred in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972), which invalidated a handful of vagrancy laws on vagueness grounds. Some of the defendants
were African Americans and women, and the Justices strongly suggested that the liberty approach
served the goals of equality: “Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance—
poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers—may be required to comport themselves according
to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. . . . [T]he scheme . . .
furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials,
against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’ ” Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)). Justice Douglas ends his hedge toward equality thus: “[T]he rule
of law implies equality and justice in its application. . . . The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society
together.” Id. at 171.
180.

See supra Section II.C.

181.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

182. For an earlier discussion of this interpretation in Davey, see supra text accompanying
notes 94–100.
183.

Davey, 540 U.S. at 724–25.

184.

Id.

185.

See id. at 720–21.
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Rehnquist borrowed the trope from the abortion funding cases. One of those
had held that when the government subsidizes childbirth, it need not also
186
subsidize abortion. Another had established that when Congress establishes a program to support counseling around childbirth, it may require any
abortion-related speech to occur in a segregated institution that does not
187
receive federal aid. What made the borrowing covert was that Rehnquist
did not cite either case—and certainly did not explain the analogy to abortion funding, which involved a seemingly disparate area of constitutional
law, namely due process. His borrowing was surreptitious in this sense,
188
likely to be detected only by experts.
Now, the fact that constitutional borrowing can be covert does not in itself put it at odds with the rule of law. We can imagine good reasons for not
signposting every interpretive move. First, requiring every instance of borrowing to be explicit would force jurists to write inartful and dense opinions
when brevity would better serve their needs. Second, there are many situations where a linkage between two domains is historically established such
that it is uncontroversial to assert it in shorthand. Third, covert borrowing
can be useful for reaching a defensible position, so long as the move away
from the norm of transparency is for a jurisprudentially acceptable purpose.
189
Think again of Chambers v. Florida, where the record of abuse or dis190
crimination “develop[ed] a sharp conflict” among the parties. Without
accusing anyone of discrimination, the Court spoke of the potential for
abuse more generally, preferring insinuations when it came to racial misconduct. That example teaches that covertness can be productive if the
doctrinal precedents are themselves not yet adequately developed, or if a
social consensus in favor of a transformative agenda has not yet crystallized
(for reasons like these, one might have preferred the liberty rationale to the
191
equality rationale in the decades before Brown v. Board of Education).
While it does not make sense to abolish covert borrowing, there are
trade-offs when one borrows furtively. Covert appropriation gains its power
from naturalizing the linkage between disparate ideas. Many such linkages are
subtle. Thus, it is entirely possible for careful specialists, no less than ordinary
citizens, to miss the calibrated gestures. In many cases, the coupling will go
unnoticed because the asserted association is entirely uncontroversial (either
in terms of popular opinion, the expectations of specialists, or possibly both).
But in at least some instances of covert borrowing, signposting is avoided precisely because a decisionmaker anticipates controversy. This was almost
186.

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–80 (1977).

187. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on
the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”).
188.

See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 99, at 176 (calling the migration unmistakable).

189.

309 U.S. 227 (1940).

190.

Id. at 238.

191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding separate-but-equal education violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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certainly one of the calculations involved in Chambers, as the Justices apparently wished to avoid inflaming local inhabitants in a high-profile death
penalty crime. The impulse was also likely at play in Davey, where the
Court looked to sensitive abortion decisions. In such instances, a choice is
made to try to promote social acceptance of a legal position by framing it as
a foregone conclusion, an easy case. The tactic can produce moving, and
even memorable readings of law, but in some situations the suppression of
disagreement in this fashion risks producing incremental change without an
appropriate degree of public deliberation.
C. Completeness
A matter well worth investigating is the extent of appropriation. We call
this the question of completeness. How much of a prior work is copied and
what is left behind? Is it an offhand move or a serious one? Does an actor
mean to take an entire system of thought and make it salient to the matter at
hand for disputes going forward, or is it a more targeted compilation of
ideas? Is the effort meant to be duplicated in the future or, based on its
treatment, is it likely to be disowned or ignored at a later date?
192
RLUIPA exemplifies incomplete borrowing. Disagreeing with the
193
Court’s decision to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
Congress pushed back in a calibrated fashion. It did so by reappropriating
the idea of strict scrutiny for some, but not all, situations where a person’s
194
religious freedom might be unduly constrained by local law or policy. Recall that strict scrutiny had previously been transferred from other areas of
constitutional law into free exercise, only to be abandoned in Employment
195
Division v. Smith for most types of free exercise claims. In RLUIPA,
192.

RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part:

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person,
assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
193.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

194. Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA restricts strict scrutiny for land-use regulations, programs, and
penal institutions that receive federal funds or substantially burden “commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(B), 2000cc–1(b)(2). For
a more comprehensive analysis of RLUIPA, see Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Condemning
Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics of Eminent Domain, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming
2010).
195. See supra Section II.C. Under Smith, a presumption of unconstitutionality will still apply
if the government targets religious behavior, if it administers a system of individualized consideration in such a way that nonreligious actors are given relief while religious ones are not, or if a claim
is “hybrid” in the sense that it involves the violation of more than one constitutional right. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
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Congress reinstated the presumption of unconstitutionality for laws that
place a substantial burden on observance, but only in two narrow settings:
196
197
and land-use regulations.
Therefore, we should consider
prisons
198
RLUIPA a partial, legislative exercise in borrowing.
Why pursue a strategy of partial borrowing? The history of interbranch
dialogue over the scope of religious liberty already showed that the Supreme
Court favored a narrow, and decidedly court-centered, interpretation of
199
Congress’s Section Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Tailored borrowing in this instance has given the Court another opportunity
to rethink its reading of Congress’s Section Five authority without threatening the judiciary’s core function. Because the statute does not seek to
challenge the Court across the board, it is possible to imagine it as a measured response rather than a reflexive rejection. For this reason, the strategy
increases the odds that the statute will be approved, even if approval is not
200
required by the courts. If Congress’s gambit is successful, it will prompt
the Justices to back away from the notion that “strict scrutiny” is a term of
art that only judges may use in this area. Partial borrowing in RLUIPA thus
may lead to a more cooperative relationship between Congress and the Judiciary with regard to the enforcement of religious freedom. A byproduct may
be a more realistic understanding of how constitutional terminology can
cross boundaries and when mutual usage of such ideas will in fact benefit
the rule of law.
Incomplete borrowing preserves maneuverability in current and future
deliberations. For this and other reasons (particularly in the common law
system, which prefers incrementalism), it is wishful thinking to hope for a
truly complete instance of borrowing every time out. Three justifications for
incomplete borrowing come to mind: (1) it is impossible to anticipate all
uses and misuses of a particular position; (2) judges have imperfect information as to the likely reactions of key actors; and (3) given these uncertainties,

196.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.

197.

Id. § 2000cc.

198. To the extent that Congress interpreted the First Amendment in RLUIPA, it also provides
an example of constitutional borrowing.
199. For a fuller account of the history of dialogue between the Court and Congress concerning the scope of religious liberty in the wake of Smith, see Tebbe, supra note 119, at 705–11, 725–
27.
200. Congress did not limit itself to this Section Five argument, but also claimed the power to
enact RLUIPA under the Spending Clause (for the prison provisions) and under the Commerce
Clause (for the land-use provisions). Yet it is quite clear that Congress targeted these two areas in
part because it thought it could build a record of significant violations of religious freedom with
regard to institutionalized persons, on the one hand, and zoning and landmarking determinations, on
the other. That record would show violations even under Smith and would establish Congress’s
authority to enact such legislation under the enforcement power in Section Five. See 146 Cong.
Rec. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement by Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (“The [provision] requiring that substantial burdens on religious exercise be justified by a compelling interest,
applies only to cases within the spending power or the commerce power, or to cases where [it is
possible to make out a claim under the individualized assessments rule of Smith].”).
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it may be wise to see if a fresh combination of ideas takes hold before signaling total commitment, to leave room for reconsideration or a better
alignment of constitutional interests. In this respect, incomplete borrowing
aligns with the judicial instincts of incrementalism and deliberativeness,
rule-of-law values that help to promote a sense, if not always the reality, of
201
stability.
Still, for all of the potential upside of partial borrowing, there may be
drawbacks. One risk is that questions of fit may not be adequately dealt with
ahead of time, and that the consequences of appropriation later haphazardly
confronted, if at all. Another is that others may be unwilling to accept it
without knowing more. Take an instance of borrowing from one understanding of equality to another, pursued by proponents of a right to marry for
same-sex couples. Both in mobilizing the public and filing lawsuits, they
have likened denial of marriage rights on the basis of sexual orientation to
202
the injustice of a similar exclusion on the basis of race. This is more than
the borrowing of a legal precedent—it is the taking of another’s historical
experience for a persuasive purpose, and in some quarters, such a compari203
son has been actively resisted. Some of the resistance has to do with fear
that referencing someone else’s experience invariably transforms it. Doing
so may alter the historical magnitude of the earlier event by asserting a superficial, even false, equivalence; worse, the appropriation may transfer
control over historical memory. Other concerns about partial borrowing
seem to reflect uncertainties about the policy consequences of aligning race
and sexual orientation. One outraged group decried “the genderless mar204
riage project” for “mak[ing] just such an appropriation.”
Think, too, of the undue-burden and endorsement tests. Each time either
test has migrated across domains, the derivative work has changed. Reworking a legal standard from another field could involve partial borrowing.
Taking some features of a test but not others can give a misleading sense of
progress or it can obscure substantive changes to the law. Casey’s importa201.

See generally infra Section V.C (discussing implications of borrowing for minimalism).

202. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of History and Family Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at *6–7, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 17,716),
2007 WL 4725460 (“Anti-miscegenation laws were considered an intrinsic part of marriage law and
were justified as enacting what nature or God dictated and preventing ‘corruption’ of the institution
of marriage. . . . As in the case of laws regulating the duties of spouses in marriage, racial regulations that had predominated for centuries changed to reflect society’s evolving conceptions of
equality.”); Adam Liptak, Gay Marriage Through a Black-White Prism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2006,
§ 4, at 43.
203. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he traditional definition of marriage is not merely a by-product of historical injustice. Its history is of a different kind [from antimiscegenation laws].”); Karl Vick & Ashley Surdin, Most of California’s Black Voters Backed Gay
Marriage Ban; 53% of Latinos Also Supported Proposition 8, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 2008, at A3
(quoting African American outreach director of the Protect Marriage Campaign as stating that “[t]he
gay community was never considered a third of a person”).
204. Brief for United Families Connecticut as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees at *14–15, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. 17,716), 2007 WL 4725443. Of course, we do
not sanction this argument.
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tion of an existing standard conveyed the Court’s continuing commitment to
the rule of law, but it also helped to obscure the fact that its commitment to a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy had become significantly more
complicated. Just as important, partial borrowing may imply that a test is
equally demanding across contexts when in fact much depends on the particular circumstances. Application of the undue-burden test to actual state
efforts to circumscribe abortion surely warrants such a conclusion. The
same could be said of the Establishment Clause area, where proponents of
205
the endorsement approach have enjoyed only partial success. What counts
as state “endorsement” of religion is more limited than what the word signifies in equal protection law or even in ordinary parlance: to show favoritism,
support, or approval. For some, it may mean no more than that the state is
not actively discriminating against a person of faith. Others may hold a
more stringent view. But these differences are not apparent from the face of
the test or even the Court’s own definition of the term.
One final concern about an act of copying that is woefully partial: the
tactic can transfer significant discretion to differently constituted bodies,
raising doubts about the extent of an institution’s commitment to constitutional principles. As the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence has illustrated,
just what constitutes an undue burden on a woman’s right or when the state
has endorsed religion owes much to changes in the Court’s composition.
Simultaneously overt and incomplete appropriation carries added risks, as
the chances of a major doctrinal shift in the absence of sustained contemplation increase enormously.
D. Yield
It may be fruitful to ask whether an instance of borrowing is intended to
promote or resist the law’s development along its present path, and to what
extent it is successful in terms of the borrower’s aims. Such purposes and
consequences collectively constitute the yield of an act of borrowing. Along
these lines, we call the appropriation of one set of ideas to alter or expand
another area of law an offensive use of the tactic. By contrast, doing so to
shore up, amplify, or preserve the vitality of an existing set of ideas constitutes defensive borrowing. If an act of borrowing produces nothing
worthwhile in either direction, that failure may provide legitimate grounds
for criticism.
206
Grutter v. Bollinger illustrates defensive appropriation in action. The
outcome surprised many observers because it rescued affirmative action in
public universities, on the condition that admissions policies preserve the
ideal of individualized assessment of applicants’ profiles. In the process,
Justice O’Connor’s ruling drew upon the First Amendment to shore up a
205. See supra text accompanying notes 152–153 (describing adoption of the endorsement
test as an example of borrowing from equality doctrines).
206.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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besieged Equal Protection jurisprudence by carving out an island of permissive race-consciousness in a sea of race-disfavoring precedent.
In reasoning that university officials enjoyed a measure of discretion to
consider the race and ethnic background of prospective students, the opinion
might have simply recounted the ways in which the context differed from
private contracting or redistricting, and left it at that. But falling back on this
truism became difficult because of conditions the Justices themselves created: for years, they had inveighed against race-dependent decisions by
public officials, regardless of whether policies were motivated by a desire to
hurt or help minorities. Promoting the individualist position, they called
207
such proxies “offensive and demeaning,” and dangerous for “balkaniz[ing]
208
us into competing racial factions” and for “promot[ing] notions of racial
209
inferiority and lead[ing] to a politics of racial hostility.” Saying admissions decisions were different somehow seemed inadequate, open to the
criticism that this amounted to disingenuous line drawing.
Searching for a way of dealing with the prospect of thwarted public expectations may explain why the Justices chose to couch the University of
Michigan’s interest in the benign use of race in constitutional terms. Here is
how O’Connor put it: “We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
210
special niche in our constitutional tradition.” Thus, Grutter drew upon
ideas of liberty defensively.
To discern the borrowers’ possible motivations, consider a path not
taken: a strong line of cases from within equal protection jurisprudence itself, arising in the late 1940s and powerfully ratified by Brown v. Board of
211
Education, stands for the idea that the educational interaction of people
from different races enhanced the experiences of all—why not just go there?
Two concerns might have given a jurist pause. First, those precedents involved the state employing race to exclude or otherwise damage the
prospects of a racial minority. Second, the Justices had largely discredited
the practice of citing those cases expansively in the name of diversity. So
one would have to look elsewhere to give university officials the “special”
authority to take account of race. The academic freedom cases proved to be
an intriguing avenue to reach a result that had otherwise been foreclosed.
The novelty of relying on First Amendment cases to blunt the logical force
of the Court’s own recent antiaffirmative pronouncements grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause should not be missed.

207.

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995).

208.

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).

209.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).

210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. See generally Paul Horwtiz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46
B.C. L. Rev. 461 (2005) (pointing out the First Amendment implications of the ruling).
211.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Complications linger from this moment of cross-fertilization. For one
thing, many of the academic freedom cases involved teachers or students
resisting university policy and did not provide a constitutional grounding for
212
university policy based on institutional self-definition. It is not readily
apparent how far the First Amendment could be employed by universities to
resist legal challenges by individuals or burdens demanded by governmental
213
entities. Moreover, the companion case Gratz v. Bollinger made no mention of the First Amendment rationale. That absence suggests that the actual
scope of any right to self-definition on the part of the university remains
214
open to question. Worse, it could later be rejected as merely seasoning in
Grutter rather than an effort to articulate a First Amendment right in earnest.
Whatever the case, the general points, we think, hold true: the Justices creatively borrowed from a relatively unsullied area of law to avoid having to
grapple anew with its university cases from the Equal Protection context and
to justify a departure from ordinary equal protection analysis.
If Grutter involved a defensive appropriation, then a case like Boyd v.
215
United States epitomizes offensive borrowing. In that decision, Justice
Bradley invalidated a federal statute requiring a defendant or claimant in a
civil proceeding under the revenue laws of the United States to make his
papers available for inspection on pain of the allegations being “taken as
216
confessed.” The ruling made several synthetic moves with the cumulative
effect of expanding the protections of liberty and personal property under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd incorporated the British case of
217
Entick v. Carrington, in which Lord Camden deemed “illegal and void”
the Secretary of State’s practice of issuing general warrants to search private

212. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967) (holding that vague
law empowering dismissal of university employees for uttering seditious words implicated “academic freedom”); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1960) (describing “academic liberty” in
terms of associational rights of teachers); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
(holding that contempt sanction against university professor for refusing to answer questions regarding classroom lectures invaded “academic freedom and political expression,” grounded in “political
freedom of the individual”). An effort to expand the notion of “academic freedom” to encompass
certain “burdens imposed by a university” in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stevens and
Breyer, JJ.), gained only three votes. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277–81 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that some decisions by university to allocate scarce resources should be protected by “academic freedom”). For some possible readings of Grutter on this
point, see generally Horwitz, supra note 210.
213.

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

214. We take no further position on the persuasiveness of Grutter’s borrowing of the First
Amendment, other than to note that “academic freedom” was a limited and highly contested concept
in earlier cases. For a case that illustrates the fragility of the idea, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69–70 (2006) (rejecting claim that law requiring
access to military recruiters as condition for federal funds violates universities’ freedom of expressive association).
215.

116 U.S. 616 (1886).

216.

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620.

217.

(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
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homes and seize personal books, papers, and effects as evidence of seditious
218
libel. Completing the act of transplantation, Justice Bradley argued:
As every American statesman, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English
freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
219
....

Furthermore, the opinion suggested that the subject matters of the Fourth
220
and Fifth Amendments “run almost into each other.” Justice Bradley signaled the mutual appropriation underway: “We have already noticed the
intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great light on
221
each other.” In applying these broad principles to the facts at bar, he
brushed aside both the fact that no physical seizure was required by the law,
a potential hurdle for the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as any objection
that revenue proceedings are civil in nature, which arguably put the statute
222
beyond the Fifth Amendment’s bar against self-incrimination. Justice
Bradley insisted that the statute effectuated a constructive search, even if the
proceedings lacked “the aggravating incidents of actual search and sei223
zure.” Likewise, he determined the proceedings to be “quasi-criminal” in
224
nature for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In short, the importation of
foreign case law and the hedging of the Boyd Court between the possible
grounds of decision, all were conducted with the principal goal of expanding domestic notions of liberty aggressively.
How does the offensive–defensive dyad help those who wish to uncover
and assess what is transpiring? First, the terminology trains attention on the
strategic motivations and doctrinal effects entailed in borrowing. What are
the intended and actual consequences of the move—to defend rapidly eroding territory or stake out new ground? Is the appropriated material intended
218.

Id. at 818.

219.

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.

220.

Id.

221.

Id. at 633.

222. Dissatisfied with the majority’s decision to blend and give credence to both rationales,
Justice Miller preferred to say that “this is a criminal case within the meaning of that clause of the
Fifth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). To his mind, “[t]here is in fact no search
and seizure authorized by the statute.” Id. Instead, he believed that:
The order of the court under the statute is in effect a subpoena duces tecum, and, though the
penalty for the witness’s failure to appear in court with the criminating papers is not fine and
imprisonment, it is one which may be made more severe, namely, to have charges against him
of a criminal nature, taken for confessed, and made the foundation of the judgment of the
court.

Id.
223.

Id. at 635.

224.

Id. at 634.
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to cultivate a fresh line of argument or sow the seeds of an existing framework’s demise? Engaging the matter in this way focuses analysis on the
scope of a borrower’s efforts, how they might impact other lines of doctrinal
development irrespective of one’s intentions, as well as the social capital
that might have to be expended to sustain a particular project. In other
words, focusing on yield, whether defensive or offensive, aids the effort to
evaluate a particular act of borrowing.
Second, since all interpretive choices are made in an environment of cultural and political change, one can better assess what external factors a
constitutional actor might be seeking to accommodate or resist through
cross-pollination. The Grutter Court’s defensive creativity may have been a
response to an outpouring of support for affirmative action by business leaders, university presidents, and military officials. What remains to be seen is
whether the defense of diversity provokes conversations beyond the university dimension or whether Grutter and Gratz remain special cases.
Similarly, Boyd appeared to entrench still-robust notions of property and
liberty in its reading of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, drawing on confident expositions of such ideals. Later attempts to undermine Boyd’s
synthesis could be seen as efforts to limit the far-reaching nature of its
premises to effectuate the rise of the modern administrative state and en225
trench its existence. The audience for an act of cross-fertilization may not
be judges or lawyers alone, but administrators, legislators, and ordinary citizens. If this is so, then it may be worthwhile for studies of borrowing to
evaluate how effective these accommodations actually are.
V. Implications for Theory
Our investigation of borrowing carries implications for constitutional
theory. In this Part, we juxtapose our evaluation of the practice with five
prominent contemporary approaches: originalism, living constitutionalism,
minimalism, redemptive constitutionalism, and popular constitutionalism.
Chiefly, we conclude that drawing attention to cross-fertilization, and valuing it in the way we propose, cuts against theories that seek to limit judicial
creativity most strictly. On the other hand, we identify places where borrowing cannot easily be assimilated even by proposals that otherwise provide
greater room for judicial action, such as living constitutionalism and redemptive constitutionalism. We also show how an appreciation of borrowing can
augment each theory, and vice versa. Throughout, we take care to acknowledge that borrowing is only one persuasive technique among many, and we
recognize that our defense of borrowing is incidental to the main thrust of
most constitutional theory. Nevertheless, we aim to show how adherents of

225. See generally William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016 (1995); Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–1976), 76
Mich. L. Rev. 184 (1977).
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each approach could profit from a study of the practice of constitutional
borrowing.
A. Originalism
Although borrowing seems to entail just the sort of hermeneutic creativity that troubles originalists, in fact it often plays an important role in
deciphering the original meanings of the Constitution. Consequently, students of borrowing and originalists have quite a bit more to say to one
another than might at first be supposed. For clarity, we will assume here a
fairly pure form of originalism, according to which original meanings
should be virtually determinative in constitutional decisionmaking and are
226
privileged over other interpretive methods. However, we put to one side
versions of the theory that look to the subjective intent of framers or ratifiers, engaging instead with versions that privilege the initial public
227
understanding of constitutional provisions.
Two values seem to drive common versions of originalism—the democratic authority of the Constitution and the rule of law—and both of these
228
factors might at first seem to disfavor migration. First, the will of the people might be undermined if readers of one provision of the Constitution
were permitted to lift meanings from other provisions freely (assuming such
crossovers were not originally contemplated). On this view, importing a
concern for equality of gay men and lesbians into due process jurisprudence,
229
in the style of the Lawrence Court, could work to unmoor privacy law
230
from the act of ratification by the sovereign people.
Originalism is designed to enhance a second constitutional value as
231
well, namely the rule of law. The hope is that tying judges to the original
understanding of the Constitution will limit individual idiosyncrasy and result in a set of interpretations that are more stable from case to case.
Borrowing might well be seen as a threat to that sort of legal stability, because the practice entails thinking beyond the boundaries of settled doctrinal
226. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
165, 166 & n.1 (2008) (citing as examples Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 4–5, 88 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 854 (1989)).
227. This version of the theory is sometimes called “original meaning originalism.” See, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24
Const. Comment. 383, 388 (2007).
228. Primus, supra note 226, at 167 & n.6 (identifying these two principal justifications for
originalism, and citing Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. Rev. 204, 204 (1980), and Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
599 (2004)).
229.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

230. Here we are assuming that the right to privacy itself has been ratified in the first place.
For our earlier analysis of Lawrence, see supra Introduction and Section III.C.
231.

See Primus, supra note 226, at 169, 211–20.
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232

fields. Pure originalism may mistrust a judicial technique that seems to
invite just the sort of untethered interpretive ingenuity that could lead judges
to read their own predilections into the text. So, in sum, looking at both of
the values that drive originalism might suggest that adherents would resist
borrowing.
Yet in fact there is significant overlap between constitutional borrowing
and originalist practice. Interestingly, leading originalists often do look
afield when they interpret the text. As a consequence, they have something
to gain from thinking carefully about the types of, and justifications for, migration among constitutional domains. Conversely, students of borrowing
ought to pay attention to how the practice has been deployed by those who
limit themselves to historical methods of deciphering the Constitution.
233
Consider once again the majority opinion in Heller. There Justice
Scalia construes the Second Amendment partly by reference to longstanding constructions of the First Amendment’s speech provision. First, of
course, he notices that both rights have limits: at the time of the founding,
citizens were not thought to able to “speak for any purpose” and that seems
to count as evidence that they also had no entitlement “to carry arms for any
234
sort of confrontation.”
Moreover, Scalia imports the mechanism for determining the contours of
the right. Rather than the undue-burden approach proposed by Justice
Breyer in dissent, he insists on a more categorical form of protection. The
First Amendment was originally understood to prioritize speech interests
above all others—with discrete exceptions for obscenity, libel, and the
like—and it was not designed to allow courts to determine later on that the
government’s interests overrode the right to expression on a case-by-case
235
basis. So too, according to Heller, the Second Amendment was thought to
guarantee the freedom of law-abiding citizens to defend their homes through
236
the use of firearms, with the state able to limit the right only within certain
232. There is an obvious irony here, since we have argued that the exchange of ideas across
doctrinal lines most often works to foster generality and predictability in the law. See supra Section
III.A.
233. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). For our earlier discussion of the
case, see supra Section II.A.
234.

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.

235.

In his words:

Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that
scope too broad. We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of a
peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. The First Amendment contains the freedom-ofspeech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and
disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrongheaded views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of
an interest—balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them
anew.

Id. at 2821 (citations omitted).
236.

See id. at 2810.
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bounded categories, such as possession by felons, ownership by the inca237
pacitated, and carrying arms near schools.
In sum, while the Heller Court is stoutly originalist—it says at one point
that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were under238
stood to have when the people adopted them” —still it leaves ample room
239
for cross-fertilization among domains of original public meaning. Now
certainly proponents like Scalia may wish to limit borrowing to particular
time periods, namely those in which the various constitutional provisions
were framed and ratified. A borrowing enthusiast would chafe at that sort of
restriction on cross-historical sharing. Yet despite such differences, originalists may take a surprising degree of interest in this Article’s effort to define,
describe, and defend the practice.
B. Living Constitutionalism
Living constitutionalism allows interpreters to go beyond original mean240
ings, at least some of the time. Though that approach is more open to
borrowing than some others, its adherents have not yet appreciated the import of the practice for the development of constitutional understandings.
One variant of the theory holds that the Constitution’s commands have
been revised from time to time through extraordinary popular mobiliza241
tion. Those revisions are then available for application by jurists to
specific disputes. This sort of living constitutionalism dovetails with constitutional borrowing at several points. Most generally, it creates conceptual
space for the deployment of borrowing to effectuate constitutional change
that has been legitimated by sufficient popular agreement. On this view,
courts can and should engage in importation when doing so would help
to clear pathways of appropriate revision. Common law techniques—
237. Id. at 2816–17. Other instances of borrowing in Heller may raise questions for originalists. For instance, the opinion draws from the English Bill of Rights’s protection against the
disarmament of Protestants, id. at 2798, as well as from state constitutions in America that protect
certain gun rights. Id. at 2802–04. It makes these connections despite the possibility that differences
in context may limit these sources’ ability to decipher the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Each of these moves, too, is better understood as an instance of borrowing rather than an
argument from precedent. They are transparent in that they are difficult to miss, and yet they naturalize historical crossovers that may not be as appropriate as they seem.
238.

Id. at 2821.

239. Across domains (First Amendment–Second Amendment) as well as systems (state–
federal and English–American).
240. Living constitutionalism is difficult to define; it is often described simply in opposition
to originalism. Perhaps partly for that reason, the approach appears to be embattled today, even
among progressives. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment.
291 (2007); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 Const. Comment.
353, 353 (2007) (“It certainly seems like the originalists are winning.”). But see Jack M. Balkin,
Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, Slate, Aug. 29, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/ (“We are all living constitutionalists now.”).
241. In his Holmes Lectures, Bruce Ackerman aligns his own sophisticated theory with living
constitutionalism. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007).
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presumably including borrowing—can play a role in constitutionalism by
implementing the imperatives generated by prior engagement of the peo242
ple.
Living constitutionalism (of this ilk) has not yet acknowledged the usefulness of constitutional borrowing for its project. That should not be
altogether surprising, since the practice we identify has operated in the
background until now. Quite simply, borrowing is one of the ways in which
243
jurists incorporate acts of popular mobilization into the canon.
Conversely, living constitutionalism has a contribution to make to the
argument of this Article, namely the insight that borrowing may find sources
not only in court decisions, but also in extraordinary statutes and other
products of clear democratic expression. For example, Bruce Ackerman has
argued that decisions upholding the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, together
with popular approval of the laws themselves, may elevate to canonical sta244
tus the constitutional judgments contained in the laws. If that is right, then
courts may legitimately lift devices or mechanisms from these laws for use
245
in constitutional interpretation, application, and even extrapolation.
Our assessment of constitutional borrowing also exceeds the bounds of
this brand of living constitutionalism. That theory rejects common law techniques that stray too far from acts of popular sovereignty. Unmoored from
expressions of the people’s will—whether in formal amendments, landmark
statutes, or momentous elections—constitutional interpretation risks impair246
ing its legitimacy. In our view, however, constitutional borrowing may be
appropriate not solely when it lifts concepts from authorities that have received the imprimatur of democratic mobilization, but more generally when
247
doing so will promote values of generality and empowerment. That is not
to say that rule-of-law considerations will always trump considerations of
popular sovereignty whenever a particular instance of cross-pollination is
242. Leib, supra note 240, at 361 (arguing that living constitutionalists allow “interpretive
mechanics” and “ ‘extrinsic’ constitutional modalities” to play a role throughout constitutional interpretation, while originalists allow use of these mechanisms only “in later conceptual stages of the
interpretive enterprise”). In particular, Ackerman hopes to show how judicial techniques can be
employed to elevate the status of the Second Reconstruction to “one of the greatest acts of popular
sovereignty in American history.” Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1788.
243. Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1788 (“My aim has been to provide common law tools that
will permit the profession to recognize the Second Reconstruction for what it was—one of the
greatest acts of popular sovereignty in American history.”).
244.

Id. at 1791 (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).

245. Consider an extraordinary implication: judges might begin to revise their treatment of
laws that impose a disparate impact on certain subordinate groups. Instead of requiring litigants to
show a discriminatory purpose in order to trigger serious judicial examination, courts could import
from statutes concerning employment and housing a rebuttable presumption of invalidity for laws
that reinforce social stratification. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 100–01. Looking to these transformative statutes might also inspire courts to craft remedies for disparate impact that involve the
judgments of political branches.
246.

Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1801.

247. In this sense, constitutional borrowing may have greater affinity with the “organicists”
that Ackerman identifies, such as Justices Holmes and Jackson. Id. at 1800–01.
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assessed. But our account does provide independent reasons for supporting
specific acts of borrowing that cannot be found among arguments supplied
by living constitutionalists.
C. Minimalism
Constitutional borrowing is a tool of common law adjudication available
for use by minimalist judges. It is conceptually compatible with incremental
decisionmaking and may be deployed in the spirit of judicial modesty. Yet
minimalism would probably resist full-blown migration in ways that students of borrowing might profitably consider. Conversely, borrowing’s
virtues may give strict minimalists some reason for pause.
Minimalism champions judicial humility expressed in an incremental
248
method of constitutional adjudication. It encourages courts to decide as
little as possible in order to minimize certain risks, including the possibility
of outright error. Minimalism is also designed to reduce the risk of political
backlash against controversial decisions. To the degree that the law is left
undertheorized, chances improve that a judgment may win the approval of
249
people with diverse foundational commitments.
Minimalism opposes pure forms of originalism, which prioritize original
meaning over precedent or tradition with potentially revolutionary conse250
quences. It also stands against perfectionist theories of interpretation, both
liberal and conservative, that seek to interpret the Constitution in accordance
251
with one or another substantive philosophy or vision of justice. In contrast
to these theories, minimalism urges judges to build on the collective wisdom
of the Anglo-American constitutional tradition in stepwise fashion.
Instances of minimalist borrowing are commonplace and may occur
whenever courts trade among closely related fields of constitutional law. If

248. We describe an ideal-typical version of minimalism that is useful for our analysis but not
identical to the theory advanced by any specific thinker. Of course the prominent version is associated with Cass Sunstein. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
on the Supreme Court (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme RightWing Courts Are Wrong for America 27–30 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Radicals in
Robes]; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Foreword]. Another adherent
of minimalism might be Justice Stephen Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 5–6
(2005). For an eloquent critique, see Ronald Dworkin, Looking for Cass Sunstein, N.Y. Rev. Books,
April 30, 2009, at 29.
249. For additional discussion of minimalists’ preference for “shallow” rulings, see Sunstein,
Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 364, and Sunstein, Foreword, supra note 248, at 20–22.
250. If the framers envisioned incremental constitutional evolution, then originalism and
minimalism may dovetail. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 389.
251. Id. at 394 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), and Richard A. Epstein,
Takings (1985), as implicit examples of liberal and conservative perfectionism, respectively); see also
Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, supra note 248, at 31–34 (describing the characteristics of perfectionist
theorists). For another example of perfectionism, see James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional
Democracy (2006).
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Lawrence can be understood as a minimalist decision, as some have argued,
then its importation of certain equality notions fulfills the aims of
252
One of the techniques exemplified in that case—
incrementalism.
hedging—aligns particularly well with minimalism’s skepticism of doctrinal
maximalism and experimentation at reduced cost. Should either the equality
or liberty rationale prove more durable because it is less controversial, the
other rationale can be adjusted, all without doing violence to the law. In this
way, judicious resort to borrowing may help to generate principled yet
incomplete statements of law.
Even so, borrowing cannot easily be confined to thin readings of law
and, in fact, it could well be turned to the cause of theoretical ambition. One
story we have told recounts how the Court has traded between equality and
liberty conceptions of the Free Exercise Clause, initially by lifting the strict
scrutiny mode of analysis from speech decisions in the 1960s, and later by
displacing that approach with a ban on disparate impact claims taken from
253
equal protection law. Neither of those instances necessarily exceeded the
bounds of legitimate borrowing that we have set out. They therefore suggest
that there may be a tension between exuberant borrowing and pure minimalism. Restricting borrowing to minimalist uses will almost certainly tend to
254
dilute its virtues, particularly generality and empowerment. Whereas
minimalism tends to limit adjudication to specific areas of doctrine, constitutional borrowing may support decisions that look beyond the immediate
legal domain for useful tools and points of mutual contact.
While our analysis does not undermine minimalism as a general interpretive orientation, it does encourage minimalists to identify places where
borrowing may promote or impede incremental adjudication. Conversely,
proponents of borrowing should consider whether the values associated with
the practice might sometimes be overbalanced by the risks that that minimalism warns against.
D. Redemptive Constitutionalism
Recently Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel have called for a “redemptive
constitutionalism,” under which judges, legislators, and litigants would work
to vindicate the egalitarian purposes of the original Constitution and the Re255
construction Amendments. Redemptive constitutionalism was practiced
during the civil rights movement of the 1960s (which they refer to as the
252. See Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 378–79 & 379 n.138 (offering
Lawrence as an example of rationalist minimalism, though acknowledging other possible readings
of the decision).
253.

See supra Section II.C.

254. Sunstein has recognized that minimalism may put pressure on the rule of law. Sunstein,
Burkean Minimalism, supra note 248, at 365 (“Narrowness [which is prized by minimalists] is
likely to breed unpredictability and perhaps unequal treatment. It might even do violence to the rule
of law, if only because it leaves so much uncertainty.”).
255.

Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 101–03.
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Second Reconstruction), but its methods have largely been forgotten. So
Balkin and Siegel urge jurists to recapture the mechanisms by which Congress and the Court worked together during the civil rights era to fulfill the
257
original promise of the First Reconstruction.
Redemptive constitutionalism entails significant acts of constitutional
borrowing, as a matter of both description and prescription. It recalls that
during the civil rights era the Court often combated social stratification not
solely through equality law itself, but also by guaranteeing individual liberty
258
for all. Promoting egalitarianism through liberty had the advantage of reducing the risk of backlash by dominant groups, members of which would
also enjoy the benefits of increased protection against government. Yet protecting individual freedom nonetheless furthered the Reconstruction project
of dismantling the racial caste system. For example, free speech doctrine
imported the mechanism of strict scrutiny in early decisions that ensured the
259
ability of the NAACP to protest civil rights abuses. Similarly, the Court
resuscitated substantive due process, which had previously been associated
260
with economic rights, in order to protect women’s autonomy and thereby
261
guarantee their status as equal citizens. In these ways and others, the Court
bridged the domains of liberty and equality to further an egalitarian vision
of the Constitution.
As for prescription, redemptive constitutionalism endorses what
amounts to an assertive deployment of borrowing across domains of law
associated with liberty and equality. Lawrence is of course the most prominent recent example. As we noted above, and as Balkin and Siegel also
appreciate, liberty models are attractive to gay rights advocates because they
avoid forcing people to define themselves as members of an identity group
262
in order to win protection. Sexual autonomy and criminal procedure are
two other domains in which protecting individual liberty can work to dis263
mantle social stratification.
256.

Id. at 97–99.

257. Id. at 93–95. Redemptive constitutionalism diverges from living constitutionalism, despite its similar progressive orientation. At root, the former seeks, as its title suggests, to redeem—to
revive and reinvigorate the egalitarian principles of the First and Second Reconstructions. In that
respect, it may be closer to originalism than it is to living constitutionalism. Accordingly, in his most
recent work, Jack Balkin has heartily endorsed many aspects of originalism. Balkin, supra note 240.
258.

Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 100.

259. See e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Although Balkin & Siegel do not cite
Button or describe that specific instance of borrowing, the example is consonant with their more
general description of the Warren Court’s attempt to protect the speech rights of the NAACP in
order to further equality goals. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 90.
260.

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

261.

Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 94.

262.

Id. at 99–100.

263. Redemptive constitutionalism may also entail reworking equal protection law not by
reference to liberty protections, but instead by means of devices taken from civil rights statutes. One
way to invigorate equal protection, according to Balkin and Siegel, is to “borrow[]” from employ-
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Our defense of borrowing therefore legitimates one judicial mechanism
for implementing redemptive constitutionalism. Several of that theory’s proposals may be achieved through the practice, as we have just shown. In this
way, at least, the two projects resonate with one another.
In another sense, however, spotlighting constitutional borrowing reveals
a challenge for the redemptive project. The difficulty arises out of the relative agnosticism of the technique we have identified. For every act of
importation that promises to revive the progressive potential of the First and
Second Reconstructions, there is an available act that may retrench social
stratification. One might wonder what will persuade courts to source their
concepts from the redemptive tradition of American constitutionalism,
which includes the achievements of the civil rights era, rather than the retro264
gressive tradition furthered by decisions such as the Civil Rights Cases,
265
266
City of Boerne, and Washington v. Davis. Nothing in our defense of the
practice commands that sort of retrenchment, obviously, but nothing we
have said prohibits it either. Such indeterminacy does not defeat redemptive
constitutionalism’s agenda, but it does mean that the theory must give independent reasons why judges should lift their ideas from redemptive domains
of law rather than from retrogressive ones.
E. Popular Constitutionalism
Popular constitutionalism seems at first blush to have the least to learn
from our treatment of constitutional borrowing. As it presents itself,
267
that theory—or family of theories —is concerned with the allocation of
ment and voting rights law the device of “mak[ing] more use of rebuttable presumptions when policies have significant disparate impact” on traditionally subordinated groups. Id. at 100–01. Of
course, reviving disparate impact doctrine on the model of the Civil Rights Acts runs headlong into
the problem of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which has itself been a source of judicial
appropriation, as we have shown. See supra Section II.C. Redemptive constitutionalism purports to
resolve that tension by proposing not that courts require defendants to remedy disparate impact, but
instead that they fashion remedies that heighten political accountability by requiring lawmakers to
justify publicly any effect that their enactments may have of reinforcing caste inequality in America.
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 7, at 101.
Balkin and Siegel further urge courts to abandon the binary model of judicial scrutiny, which
neatly divides authority between judges and legislatures, depending on whether the classification at
issue draws strict scrutiny or not. Instead, they advocate Justice Marshall’s sliding-scale approach.
Id. at 101 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98–110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Presumably this change would affect several areas of constitutional doctrine
via the borrowing mechanism. It dovetails with the observation we make above that the Court recently has been distancing itself from the tiers-of-scrutiny framework altogether in one
constitutional domain after another. See supra Section II.A.
264.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

265.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

266.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

267. Popular constitutionalism is perhaps most closely associated with Larry Kramer, but we
are using the term to refer to a group of loosely related views. What they have in common is skepticism toward the widespread assumption of judicial dominance over constitutional interpretation and
enforcement. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959,
967–74 (2004) (describing varieties of living constitutionalism).
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interpretive authority between the courts (and government as a whole) and
the populace, not with specific discursive practices. According to popular
constitutionalism, the role of the people in American governance does, and
should, “include[] active and ongoing control over the interpretation and
268
enforcement of constitutional law.” That project appears to sideline arguments about whether and how judges should practice cross-pollination when
they interpret the Constitution.
Yet there are synergies between popular constitutionalism and the custom of borrowing. These points of convergence both provide helpful
arguments for popular constitutionalists and suggest areas of future research
for students of borrowing. Specifically, popular constitutionalism points out
that the migration of ideas may well occur not only among judges and not
only between judges and lawmakers, but also between lawyers and activists.
Insofar as we are correct that constitutional ideas migrate outside adjudicative and legislative processes, popular constitutionalists may gain an
additional way to question the common assumption that judges ought to be
given exclusive or final authority over the signification of constitutional
provisions. For once we see that citizens and groups, too, can creatively redeploy readings of the Constitution, then judges have one less claim to a
monopoly over its interpretation. We have mostly analyzed borrowing by
jurists, but the same tools are readily wielded by nonspecialists. After all,
one teaching of popular constitutionalism is that social actors can reclaim
legal techniques that are ordinarily practiced by professionals. Our observation, if correct, would open up a promising area of inquiry into the practice
of constitutional borrowing by “the people themselves.”
The study of borrowing offers a more specific contribution as well, one
that pertains to the normative claim of popular constitutionalism. Advocates
of that theory argue not simply that interpretation of our basic law ought to
take place among the people, but also that disputes over the meaning of the
269
Constitution ought not to be settled finally by the Supreme Court. They
seek to destabilize the assumption, widespread among Americans, that the
Court’s word concerning the meaning of constitutional law ought to be
270
paramount.
Popular constitutionalism claims to be different from living constitutionalism—as we have described it in Section IV.A.—in the sense that while the latter focuses on the ability of the people to
alter or amend the Constitution, the former also describes and defends their power to engage in
constitutional interpretation and enforcement. See id. at 961 n.3 (distinguishing Bruce Ackerman’s
work from popular constitutionalism).
268. Id. at 959. One of us has advanced a theory according to which the development of a
popular language is a core aspect of constitutionalism. See Tsai, supra note 11.
269. That stronger position is associated not only with Larry Kramer, but also arguably with
Mark Tushnet and Sanford Levinson. Id. at 985. Representative works include Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Faith (1988); Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (2003); Mark
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement (1999); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 489 (2006).
270.

Kramer, supra note 267, at 985.
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We aim to intervene at a particular point in that argument. A common
reason for giving final interpretive authority to the Court is that the nation
needs to definitively resolve intractable legal disputes to reduce uncertainty
and unpredictability. On this view, the Court occupies the best institutional
271
position for providing a final determination. Defenders of popular constitutionalism have responded by challenging the empirical claim that the
Court does in fact provide better closure on controversial matters, as well as
by pointing out that institutional design alone cannot determine whether
272
courts deliver legal certainty. Examination of how these institutions actually function may yield surprisingly little evidence of any “settlement gap”
273
between a system of judicial supremacy and more diffuse arrangements.
We have argued that the judicial practice of constitutional borrowing can
bolster predictability and empowerment. If that is right, then our treatment
of borrowing may open up a new line of argument for popular constitutionalists, namely that nonjudicial actors are also capable of strategic leveraging
and therefore that any claim of judicial distinctiveness in this regard may be
overdrawn. When politicians, administrators, and advocates leverage
mechanisms from one domain of constitutional law in some other area, they
too promote rule-of-law values—just as effectively as judges. The notion
that borrowing by nonjudges can enhance legal stability further weakens the
claim that courts enjoy a peculiar institutional advantage in settling matters
of constitutional importance.
Furthermore, the synergy between popular constitutionalism and our
study of borrowing suggests further research opportunities. In particular, it
tees up an investigation of the social conditions most favorable to crossover
attempts by nonjudicial actors as well as exploration into when these opportunities are bypassed. Such studies may illuminate the pragmatic
considerations that motivate acts of borrowing, obstacles to their reception,
and the microprocesses of conceptual change. Along the way, researchers
could uncover the various ways in which popular and judicial borrowing
274
inform one another. Who knows? Evidence of widespread borrowing
could bolster or undercut our guardedly positive evaluation of its effects.
271. Id. at 987; Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 234–35 & n.13 (2004) (citing Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997)).
272.

Kramer, supra note 271, at 234; Kramer, supra note 267, at 987–88.

273. Kramer, supra note 267, at 987 (“[E]xperience suggests that if there is a ‘settlement gap’
between a world with judicial supremacy and a world without it, that gap is likely to be small.”). At
least one scholar has argued that a judge’s role is to help sustain a level of “unsettlement” regarding
the Constitution’s meanings. See Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A
New Defense of Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2001).
274. Some studies have examined constitutional debate in this vein. See, e.g., Tsai, supra note
11, at ch. 4 (juxtaposing civil rights advocates of the 1960s and social conservatives of the 1980s
and showing how courts absorbed their mobilized discourse); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470
(2004); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of WomanProtective Antiabortion Argument, 57 Duke L.J. 1641 (2008); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis:
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Conclusion
Constitutional borrowing is a historical fact. It is also alive and well today, with persons of different ideological inclinations enlisting the technique
on behalf of divergent legal arguments. Despite its prevalence, until now the
practice has rarely received a sustained examination or defense. Here, we
have defined constitutional borrowing, cataloged its various forms, justified
the practice from a rule-of-law perspective, and offered some tools for critiquing particular acts of borrowing. We have argued that while borrowing is
not an unalloyed good, it nevertheless often serves core rule-of-law values.
And if we are correct that it is a defensible fixture of democratic constitutionalism, then a number of theories of constitutional lawmaking should be
reexamined. Accounts that can incorporate borrowing might do so by elaborating the conditions under which borrowing is normatively desirable.
Proponents of more mechanistic notions of judging ought to explain why
borrowing is incompatible with their accounts and how, precisely, borrowing
is to be avoided.
We recognize that constitutional borrowing is a species of a broader
phenomenon worthy of more fine-grained investigation. Appropriations occur throughout the law. Custodians of the law are constantly copying,
adapting, and recycling ideas, frameworks, and heuristics. Looking ahead, it
may be useful to consider what, if any, distinctive issues are raised when
some kinds of borrowing are compared to others (say, importing from the
common law or from statutes as opposed to appropriating from domestic
constitutional law or foreign jurisdictions). Each of these projects would
help jurists confront the reality that in our system of government, borrowing
is the rule rather than the exception.

An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 363 (2008) (examining the social
conditions under which presidential rhetoric led to judicial reversal over right of conscience and
endorsement of prorights position).

